Econometric Inference on Large Bayesian Games with Heterogeneous Beliefs by Song, Kyungchul
ECONOMETRIC INFERENCE ON LARGE BAYESIAN GAMES WITH
HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS
KYUNGCHUL SONG
Abstract. Econometric models on games often assume observation of many replications of
a single representative game. Such a framework is not adequate when one observes multiple
heterogeneous many-player games, as in many models of social interactions. This paper
considers a static large Bayesian game, and develops inference methods which does not re-
quire a common prior assumption, and allows for the players to form beliefs differently from
other players. By drawing on the main intuition of Kalai (2004), this paper introduces the
notion of a hindsight regret which measures each player’s ex post value of other players’ type
information, and obtains its belief-free bound. From this bound, this paper derives testable
implications and develops an asymptotic inference procedure for the structural parameters.
Key words. Large Game; Incomplete Information; Heterogenous Beliefs; Bayesian Nash
Equilibria; Ex Post Stability; Hindsight Regrets; Cross-Sectional Dependence; Partial Iden-
tification; Moment Inequalities.
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1. Introduction
Many economic outcomes arise as a consequence of agents’ decisions under the influence
of others’ choices. Endogeneity of such influence poses the main challenge for an empirical
researcher. In response to this challenge, a strand of empirical methods explicitly model
interactions among the agents. These models often share two main features. First, they
assume observation of many i.i.d. replications from a single representative game, so that sta-
tistical independence is imposed across the replications, whereas strategic interdependence
is kept within each replication. Second, they rely on a common prior assumption, where
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the type distribution is assumed to be common knowledge among the players. (See Bresna-
han and Reiss (1991), Tamer (2003), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Aradillas-Lopez (2010),
Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011), Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008), and de
Paula and Tang (2011), among many others, for methodological contributions.1)
Such a framework does not fit well a situation where there are interactions among many
agents. For example, consider studying peer effects among students. One may view interac-
tions among the students in each school as one game. Each school has a different number
of students. In order to view the games as arising from a single representative game, one
introduces further specifications such as whether the equilibrium is selected across schools
differently or not, whether the strategies of students in the same school are the same or
not, etc. This observation applies to many other examples, such as studies on neighbor-
hood effects on the choice of housing location or on the effect of friendship networks on
the students’ smoking behavior. Many such examples are found in the literature of social
interactions. (See Brock and Durlauf (2001b and 2007) for their pioneering works on the
structural modeling of social interactions. See also surveys by Brock and Durlauf (2001a)
and a recent monograph by Ioannides (2013) for this literature.)
This paper proposes an alternative modeling view in which heterogeneity across the games
and heterogeneity across the players are given characteristics of a single large Bayesian
game. For example, in the study of the peer effects mentioned before, this framework
views interactions within each school as a subgame of a large game, where subgames are
allowed to be heterogeneous in various aspects such as the number of the players, their
payoff specifications, and the way they form beliefs about other players’ types. Furthermore,
the sets of subgame equilibria across different subgames are not required to be identical.2
The econometrician observes outcomes from a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(possibly among multiple equilibria), and attempts to make inference about the structural
parameters of the game. While the equilibrium is driven by the subjective beliefs of the
players, the validity of the econometrician’s inference is measured in terms of the Nature’s
objective probability. Thus the inference procedure in this paper is valid regardless of how an
1Also see Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer (2007), Rosen (2008), Bugni (2010), Andrews and Soares (2010),
Andrews and Shi (2013), Chernozhukov, Lee and Rosen (2013), among many others, for general theory of
inference for models under moment inequality restrictions. Note that the representative game models have
been among the main motivation behind this literature. Among the notable exceptions to this representative
small game framework are Xu (2010), Bisin, Mora and Topa (2011), and Menzel (2012). We will discuss
these papers briefly later.
2This paper confines attention to simultaneous-move games with an unordered finite action space. Hence
auction models with continuous bids are excluded. Global network games with endogenous network formation
or matching games are also excluded because the action space increases as the number of players increases.
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equilibrium is selected, or whether the sets of equilibria across different games are identical
or not.3
The main departure of this model from the existing literature is that the players are allowed
to form beliefs differently from each other. Regarding the subjective beliefs of the players,
it is assumed that they commonly (and correctly) believe that the types are conditionally
independent given their public signal, and that any event a player believes highly likely
to occur does occur with high probability. Within the boundary of these two conditions,
each player is allowed to form beliefs differently using potentially different priors. Thus the
inference procedure in this paper is robust to the way individual players form their beliefs
about other players’ types or beliefs. If it is desirable that the predictions from game models
be robust to particular assumptions about individual players’ belief formation, as emphasized
by Wilson (1989) and Bergemann and Morris (2005), the same may apply all the more to
econometric inference on such models.4
The main challenge for the econometrician in this environment is to recover the subjective
beliefs. Manski (2004) proposes using data on subjective probabilities in choice studies. See
Dominitz and Manski (1997) for a study on subjective income expectations, and Li and Lee
(2009) for an investigation of rational expectations assumptions in social interactions using
subjective expectations data. However, in strategic environments with many players, it is
often not easy to procure data on players’ expectations on other players’ types prior to the
play.
Instead of attempting to recover subjective beliefs, this paper develops what this paper
calls a hindsight regret approach, based on the insights of Kalai (2004) and Deb and Kalai
(2010). The hindsight regret for each player measures ex post payoff loss due to the player’s
not being able to observe the other players’ types. More specifically, the hindsight regret
quantifies the amount of additional compensation needed to preserve each player’s incentive
compatibility constraint in equilibrium even after all the players’ types are revealed. This
paper provides a general form of belief-free hindsight regret which is used to form an ex post
version of incentive compatibility constraints for each player in equilibrium.
3Note that the notion of an equilibrium selection rule in the literature already presumes replications of a
single representative game. When two games are different with different sets of equilibria, there cannot be
an equilibrium selection rule that applies to both the games.
4Note the unique contribution by Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) for various implications of assumptions
of higher order beliefs in econometric game models. The main difference between Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer
(2008) and this paper is two fold. First, Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) focused on level k rationalizability
where uncertainty faced by a player is about other players’ actions, whereas uncertainty faced by a player
in this paper’s game is confined to other players’ payoff types. Second, the main purpose of the study by
Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) was to explore implications of various higher order belief configurations
for econometric inference, whereas this paper pursues an inference method robust to various higher order
belief configurations within the Nash equilibrium framework.
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Using the ex post incentive compatibility constraints, this paper derives testable implica-
tions which the econometrician can use for inference without knowledge of a particular way
beliefs are formed. The implications are formulated as moment inequalities in a spirit similar
to Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). The tightness of the moment inequalities (thus the nontriv-
iality of subsequent inference) depends on how strongly any two players are strategically
interdependent. When the reference group is large, and each player’s payoff is affected by
the action of another player in inverse proportion to the group sizes, the inequalities can be
fairly tight, opening the possibility of nontrivial inference. On the other hand, this condition
excludes the situation where the econometrician observes many small private information
games as in Aradillas-Lopez (2010) and de Paula and Tang (2011).
For inference, the paper proposes two wild bootstrap methods and establishes their as-
ymptotic validity, as the number of the players increases to infinity. The asymptotic validity
is uniform over the probabilities that the Nature adopts for drawing the players’ types. This
paper’s approach for inference is inspired by the work of Andrews (2005) who investigated
the inference problem in the presence of common shocks in short panel data. (See Kuer-
steiner and Prutcha (2012) for a related research on dynamic panel models.) As in Andrews
(2005), the test statistic proposed in this paper has a functional of a mixture normal distri-
bution as its limiting distribution in the least favorable configuration of the null hypothesis,
but we cannot use the random norming as he did to pivotize the test statistic, because the
restrictions here are inequalities rather than equalities. The method of wild bootstrap in
this paper obviates the need to pivotize the test statistic.
Later the paper presents a Monte Carlo simulation study based on a social interactions
model. First, it is found that the larger the hindsight regrets are, the more conservative
the inference becomes. This finding is intuitive. When the hindsight regrets are large,
the testable restrictions are not strong enough to give nontrivial information about the
structural parameters. Second, even when the coverage probabilities are reported to be 1, the
bootstrap inference may exhibit good power properties. Third, when the social interaction
parameter is positive, its confidence set covers zero with almost zero probability, which means
the bootstrap procedure detects deviation from the null hypothesis of no social interaction
extremely well. Fourth, the results show that ignoring the hindsight regrets lead to invalid
inference in general.
The existing econometrics literature of games often assumes observation of many indepen-
dent replications from a single representative game, so that statistical independence is im-
posed across the replications, whereas strategic interdependence is kept within each replica-
tion. See Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Tamer (2003), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Aradillas-
Lopez (2010), Bajari, Hong, Krainer and Nekipelov (2010), Beresteanu, Molchanov, and
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Molinari (2011), Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008), and de Paula and Tang (2011) for ex-
ample. See de Paula (2010) for references. See Krauth (2006) and de Paula (2010) for using
the framework of many replications of a representative game in analysis of social interactions
among people. In contrast to such a framework, this paper’s approach does not require that
one observe many games for asymptotically valid inference. The asymptotic validity holds
as long as the number of the players is large, regardless of how they are partitioned into dif-
ferent subgames. This feature is convenient in particular, for it accommodates a single large
game such as a social interactions model with multiple large overlapping reference groups.
This paper’s framework is most relevant to various models of social interactions. As a
seminal paper in the structural modeling and estimation of social interactions, Brock and
Durlauf (2001) developed discrete choice-based models of social interactions. Their discrete-
choice based approach influenced many researches such as Krauth (2006), Ioannides and
Zabel (2008), and Li and Lee (2009) to name but a few. (See Blume, Brock, Durlauf,
and Ioannides (2011) and the monograph by Ioannides (2010) for recent methodological
progresses in the literature of social interactions.) In contrast with this approach, this paper
relaxes symmetry of equilibrium strategies or rational expectations. Furthermore, this paper
fully develops a bootstrap inference procedure which is asymptotically valid regardless of
whether there are multiple equilibria, or how the equilibrium is selected across different
games. On the other hand, the approach of Brock and Durlauf, within the boundary of their
set-up, is simpler to use than this paper’s approach.
It is also worthwhile to compare this paper’s approach with recent researches by Xu (2012),
Bisin, Moro, and Topa (2011), and Menzel (2012). These researches are more explicit about
the inferential issues in a large game model. Xu (2012) studied a single large Bayesian
game framework like this paper, but his inference procedure requires various conditions that
yield uniqueness of the equilibrium and point-identification of the parameters. On the other
hand, Bisin, Moro, and Topa (2011) admit multiple equilibria, but their equilibrium con-
cept requires asymptotic stability of the aggregate quantities (as the number of the players
increases). Menzel (2012) recently developed asymptotic theory for inference based on large
complete information games where type-action profiles are (conditionally) exchangeable se-
quences.5
This paper is organized as follows. The first section formally introduces a large Bayesian
game, and discusses examples. Section 3 introduces a belief-free version of hindsight regrets.
5The fundamental difference between Menzel (2012) and this paper lies in modeling the probability of
observations. Menzel employs a complete information game model where the randomness of the observed
outcomes is mainly due to the sampling variations. Thus random sampling schemes and their variants
justify his exhangeability conditions. On the other hand, this paper considers an incomplete information
game, where the randomness of observed outcomes stems from the inherent heterogeneity across players due
to Nature’s drawing of types.
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Section 4 turns to the assumptions for econometric inference, and derives testable implica-
tions. Section 5 proposes general inference methods and establishes their uniform asymptotic
validity. Section 6 presents and discusses Monte Carlo simulation results. For simplicity of
exposition, most of the results in the paper are obtained assuming a binary action space.
Their extension to the case of a general finite action set is provided in the appendix.
A supplemental note to this paper is available. The note consists of three sections. The
first section explains in detail how the belief-free hindsight regrets and general testable
implications in the paper can be derived for various parametric specifications of payoffs in
social interactions models. The second section offers a multivariate version of McDiarmid’s
inequality and its proof. The inequality is crucial for deriving a belief-free version of hindsight
regret. The third section presents the full mathematical proofs of the results in the paper.
2. A Large Bayesian Game with Information Groups
2.1. Information Groups of Players. In this section, we introduce formally a Bayesian
game that essentially defines the scope of the paper. Assumptions relevant to econometric
inference appears in Section 4. The game is played by N players, where each player i ∈ N ≡
{1, 2, · · ·, N} chooses an action from a common finite action set A ≡ {a¯1, · · ·, a¯K}.
At the beginning of the game, the Nature draws an outcome ω from a sample space Ω
which realizes the (payoff) type profile
T (ω) = (T1(ω), · · ·, TN(ω)) ∈ TN ,
for the N players, where Ti(ω) ∈ T ⊂ Rt represents a finite dimensional type vector for
player i. Let the distribution of T chosen by the Nature be denoted by P .
Each player belongs to a group s ∈ {1, · · ·, S} called information group, where players
in the group s commonly observe public signal Cs. Without losing generality, we assume
that Cs is a subvector of Ti for each player i in information group s. The types are con-
ditionally independent given public signals Cs. No player shares her type information with
other players (except for the public signal Cs that is already shared). In many empirical
examples, different information groups can be thought of either as separate games observed
by the econometrician, or as large overlapping reference groups of players in a single game.
(Examples are given later.)6
6The information group structure belongs to common knowledge among the players, and is exogenously
formed prior to the current game. The assumption of exogenous group formation is plausible when the
players are randomly assigned to groups only based on some public signals, or the group formation has
almost no relevance to the current game. For example, consider a study on the presidential election among
reference groups with similar demographic characteristics. In this case, the formation of the demographic
groups has little relevance to the subsequent decisions in the election. However, there are also many other
situations where the group formation is directly relevant to the current game. Extending the framework to
endogenous group formation requires a separate paper.
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Once the Nature draws a type profile T that realizes to be t = (tj)j∈N ∈ TN , each player i
observes ti and forms a belief on T . The belief is denoted by Qi(·|ti), a probability measure
on TN for each ti. Thus P is the objective probability that the econometrician uses to express
the validity of his inference method, whereas Qi is a subjective probability formed by player
i according to her prior and possibly through her higher order beliefs about other players’
beliefs. As Aumann (1976) pointed out, when P belongs to common knowledge, we have
Qi(·|ti) = P (·|ti) for all i ∈ N and ti ∈ T, (denoting the number of the players in i, and P (·|ti)
the conditional distribution of T given Ti = ti under P ) so that the distinction between the
objective and subjective probabilities is not necessary. Here it is, as we are not making such
an assumption.
We introduce a conditional independence assumption for P and Qi’s.
Assumption 1 (Conditional Independence Under Objective and Subjective
Probabilities): {Ti : i ∈ N} is conditionally independent given C = (Cs)s∈S both under
P and under Qi(·|ti) for all i ∈ N and all ti ∈ T.
By Assumption 1, any two players have types that are conditionally independent given
the public signals C according to both the objective and subjective probabilities.
Assumption 2 (One-Sided Rational Expectations on High Probability Events):
There exists a small ρ > 0 such that for any i ∈ N and any event B ⊂ T such that
Qi(B|Ti = ti) ≥ 1− ρ for all ti ∈ T, it is satisfied that P{B|Ti = ti} ≥ 1− ρ for all ti ∈ T.
Assumption 2 says that any event that a player believes strongly to occur is highly likely
to occur according to the objective probability. This assumption imposes a limited (one-
sided) version of rational expectations on the players’ beliefs on events that are believed to
be highly likely by the players. The version is one-sided in the sense that a high probability
event (according to the Nature’s experiment) is not necessarily viewed as a high probability
event by each player.
Once the Nature draws T = t with distribution P , each player i, facing the other players
choosing a−i ∈ AN−1, receives payoff ui(ai, a−i; ti) from choosing ai ∈ A, so that the payoff
of player i depends only on the players’ actions and her own type. The latter condition is
not as strong as it may seem at first, because the individual type vector Ti contains a public
signal Cs as a subvector.
A pure strategy yi for player i is an A-valued map on T, and a pure strategy profile
y = (y1, · · ·, yN), a vector of individual pure strategies. Given a profile y, the (interim)
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expected payoff for player i ∈ N is given by
Ui(y|ti) =
∫
TN
ui(y(t); ti)Qi(dt|ti),
where y(t) = (yi(ti))
N
i=1. A strategy profile y is a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium, if
for each i ∈ N, ti ∈ T, and any pure strategy y′i for i,7
(2.1) Ui(y|ti) ≥ Ui(y′i, y−i|ti).
This paper does not place restrictions on subjective beliefs Qi other than Assumptions 1-2.
8
Instead of directly observing a strategy profile, the econometrician observes its realized
action profile. Given a pure strategy equilibrium y = (y1, · · ·, yN), define
(2.2) Yi ≡ yi(Ti),
and let Y ≡ (Y1, · · ·, YN) ∈ AN . The econometrician observes Yi’s and part of Ti’s. (We will
specify the econometrician’s observations later.) The equation (2.2) is a reduced form for Yi.
When the game has multiple equilibria, this reduced form is not uniquely determined by the
game.
Given an equilibrium y, let P y be the joint distribution of (y(T ), T ), where y(T ) =
(yi(Ti))
N
i=1, when the distribution of T is equal to P . Also given y, let Q
y = (Qy1, · · ·, QyN),
where Qyi is the joint distribution of (y(T ), T ) according to player i’s beliefs about T . Under
both P y and Qy, Yi and Yj are conditionally independent given C. Since the type distribu-
tions and beliefs are all heterogeneous, the distributions of Yi’s are not necessarily identical,
even if we focus on a symmetric equilibrium.
2.2. Examples.
2.2.1. Large Games with Social Interactions. Suppose that we have disjoint S groups of
players where each group s has Ns number of players, and denote Ns to be group s. Each
group s constitutes a large game with private information. For player i in group s, we follow
Brock and Durlauf (2001b) (see (4) and (5) there) and consider either of the following two
7Existence of a pure strategy equilibrium can be established by invoking a more special structure of the
game in application. For example, see Milgrom and Weber (1985), Athey (2001), McAdams (2003) and
Reny (2011) and references therein for general results.
8To see how higher order beliefs are accommodated, first we follow Harsany (1967-1968) to extend the type
space to include the space of beliefs and higher order beliefs, that is, extend TN to (TN ,B), where B denotes
the set of beliefs and higher order beliefs. (Possibility of such an extension in most generality is affirmed by
Mertens and Zamir (1985).) Define a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the game with an extended
type space, say, y˜(t, b) for each t ∈ TN and b ∈ B. Then the pure strategy equilibrium y in this paper’s
set-up can be viewed as y(t) = y˜(t, b∗), for a given set of beliefs or higher order beliefs b∗ ∈ B. One of the
main theses of this paper is to develop an econometric inference procedure that does not require knowledge
of (and hence is robust against) b∗, as long as the eventual beliefs Qi over the payoff types Ti’s (consistent
with b∗) satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2.
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specifications of payoff functions:
(2.3) ui(ai, a−i; ti) = v1(ai; ti) + v2(ai; ti)
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
wj,saj,
or
(2.4) ui(ai, a−i; ti) = v1(ai; ti)− v2(ti)
2
·
ai − ∑
j∈Ns\{i}
wj,saj
2 ,
where v1(ai; ti) is a component depending only on (ai, ti), and wj,s ≥ 0 and
∑
j∈Ns\{i}wj,s = 1.
The first specification expresses interaction between player i’s action (ai) and the average
actions of the other players. The second specification captures preference for conformity to
the average actions of the other players.
2.2.2. A Large Game with Multiple Overlapping Reference Groups. Suppose that the game
is a large private information game with multiple overlapping information groups Ns with
s = 1, ···, S. The information groups are reference groups such that the average of the actions
by players in each group affects the payoff of the players in the group. More specifically, the
playoff function takes the following form
ui(ai, a−i;Ti) = vi(ai;Ti) +
aiθ
|Si|
∑
s∈Si
 1
Ns − 1
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
aj
 ,
where Si ⊂ S denotes the set of the indices of the reference groups that player i belongs to.
Each group s may represent social groups. The within-group correlation among the types
Ti is permitted through the public signal Cs. More importantly the reference groups are
allowed to be overlapping, so that each player i may belong to multiple reference groups
simultaneously and yet differently from many other players.
For simplicity of exposition, we focus on the case with binary action space A = {0, 1}
for the rest of the paper. The general case of a multinomial action set is dealt with in the
appendix.
3. Belief-Free Hindsight Regrets
In this section, we introduce the notion of hindsight regrets and establish its belief-free
version. This version is used later to derive testable implications from the large game model.
First, we rewrite the equilibrium constraints in (2.1) as follows: for given equilibrium y, for
all i ∈ N and all a¯ ∈ A,
(3.1) Eyi [ui(Yi;Ti)− ui(a¯, Y−i;Ti)|Ti = ti] ≥ 0,
10 SONG
where Eyi [·|Ti = ti] is conditional expectation (under Qyi ) given Ti = ti. Such constraints
are generally useful for deriving moment inequalities for inference. However, they cannot be
directly used here, due to the heterogeneous subjective beliefs of the players.
The hindsight regret approach of this paper replaces the inequality in (3.1) by the following
ex post version:
(3.2) ui(Y ;Ti)− ui(a¯, Y−i;Ti) ≥ −λ,
which is ensured to hold with large probability according to player i’s belief Qyi , by choosing
a compensation scheme λ ≥ 0 appropriately. The compensation λ prevents player i from
switching from her action Yi in equilibrium to action a¯ (with large probability) after the
types of all the players are revealed to her.
For use in econometric inference, we seek to find a minimal compensation scheme that
does not rely on beliefs of the players (except through already given equilibrium y.) As we
will see later, the quality of prediction and the econometrician’s inference improves with the
use of a tighter compensation scheme.
3.1. Strategic Interdependence among the Players. A player’s hindsight regret mea-
sures ex post loss of payoff due to not being able to observe the types of other players. The
notion of hindsight regret is directly related to strategic interdependence among the play-
ers. To formally introduce measure of strategic interdependence, we first define a maximal
variation of a real function. Suppose that f(x1, · · ·, xN) is a real-valued function on a set
XN ⊂ RN . Then, we write
Vj(f) = sup |f(x)− f(xj(x))| ,
where the supremum is over all x’s in XN and over all xj(x)’s in XN such that xj(x) is
x except for its j-th entry replaced by a certain element in X . We call Vj(f) a maximal
variation of f at the j-th coordinate. For example, when N = 2,
V1(f) = sup
(x1,x2,x)∈X 3
|f(x1, x)− f(x2, x)| and
V2(f) = sup
(x1,x2,x)∈X 3
|f(x, x1)− f(x, x2)|.
(Recall that we focus on a binary action set, i.e., A ≡ {0, 1}. See the appendix for a general
case of a finite action set.) For i, j ∈ N, we define ∆ij(ti; yi(ti)) as
(3.3) ∆ij(ti; yi(ti)) ≡ Vj(u∆i (·; ti)),
where
u∆i (a−i; ti, yi(ti)) ≡ ui(yi(ti), a−i; ti)− ui(1− yi(ti), a−i; ti).
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For each player i, ∆ij(ti, yi(ti)) measures the largest variation in player i’s payoff differential
u∆i between actions 1 and 0 which can be caused by player j’s arbitrary choice of an action.
Hence ∆ij(ti, yi(ti)) summarizes strategic relevance of player j to player i, and is used to
formulate belief-free hindsight regrets later.
3.2. Belief-Free Hindsight Regrets for Large Games. Given an equilibrium y, player
i ∈ N, and small number ρ ∈ (0, 1), we say that a nonnegative, R-valued map λi,ρ(·) on T is
a ρ-hindsight regret for player i, if
Qyi
{
u∆i (Y−i;Ti, Yi) ≥ −λi,ρ(Ti)|Ti
} ≥ 1− ρ, everywhere.
A ρ-hindsight regret λi,ρ for player i represents the vector of the amounts of compensations
to induce her to maintain her strategy in equilibrium y with high probability at least 1− ρ.
By definition, if λi,ρ is ρ-hindsight regret, any map gi,ρ ≥ λi,ρ is also ρ-hindsight regret.
We need to find a belief-free version of ρ-hindsight regret that is tight enough for use by the
econometrician. To characterize a belief-free hindsight regret, we let
(3.4) λi,ρ(ti) ≡
√
−1
2
Λi(ti) · log ρ,
where
Λi(ti) ≡
∑
j∈N:j 6=i
∆2ij(ti; yi(ti)).
The quantity λi,ρ(ti) is belief free in the sense that it does not depend on the subjective
beliefs Qi, other than through the given pure strategy equilibrium. Furthermore, λi,ρ(ti) is
a ρ-hindsight regret, as formalized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then for each pure strategy equilibrium y,
each ρ ∈ (0, 1), λi,ρ(·) is a ρ-hindsight regret.
Furthermore, suppose that Assumption 2 holds with ρ > 0. Then,
(3.5) P y
{
u∆i (Y−i;Ti, Yi) ≥ −λi,ρ(Ti)|Ti
} ≥ 1− ρ.
The function Λi(ti) in (3.4) measures the overall strategic relevance of the other players to
player i. Therefore, the hindsight regret increases with the strategic interdependence among
the players. This is intuitive; player i’s ex post payoff loss due to not being able to observe
the types of other players is large when actions by the other players can have a large impact
on player i’s payoff.
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Let us see how λi,ρ defined in (3.4) becomes a ρ-hindsight regret. For any λ > 0,
Qyi
{
u∆i (Y−i;Ti, Yi) ≤ −λ|Ti = ti
}
(3.6)
≤ Qyi
{
u∆i (Y−i;Ti, Yi)− Eyi
[
u∆i (Y−i;Ti, Yi)|Ti
] ≤ −λ|Ti = ti}
≤ exp (−2λ2/Λi(ti)) .
The first inequality follows because Eyi
[
u∆i (Y−i;Ti, Yi)|Ti
] ≥ 0 by the Nash equilibrium con-
straint, and the second inequality follows from McDiarmid’s inequality (McDiarmid (1989)).
Setting the last bound in (3.6) as ρ, we obtain the solution λ = λi,ρ(ti) as in (3.4). The
inequality (3.5) is an immediate consequence of this combined with Assumption 2. Later we
use (3.5) to obtain testable implications.
3.3. Examples Revisited.
3.3.1. Large Games with Social Interactions. As for the belief-free hindsight regrets, we first
consider that in both cases of (2.3),
(3.7) u∆i (a−i; ti) = v
∆
1 (ti) + v
∆
2 (ti)
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
wj,saj,
where in the specification (2.3),
v∆1 (ti) = v1(1; ti)− v1(0; ti), and
v∆2 (ti) = v2(1; ti)− v2(0; ti),
and in the specification of (2.4),
v∆1 (ti) = v1(1; ti)− v1(0; ti)− v2(ti)/2, and
v∆2 (ti) = v2(ti).
Also, in both cases, ∆ij(ti; yi(ti)) = wj,s|v∆2 (ti)| for all j 6= i, and using this, we define
λi,ρ(ti) as in (3.4). In particular, when wj,s = 1/(Ns − 1) for all j ∈ Ns\{i}, we have
(3.8) λi,ρ(ti) =
|v∆2 (ti)|√
Ns − 1
√
−1
2
log ρ.
The hindsight regret is heterogeneous across information groups, depending on the number
of the players Ns in each information group s. The more the players in a group, the smaller
the hindsight regret for the group.
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3.3.2. A Large Game with Multiple Overlapping Reference Groups. From the payoff specifi-
cation, we observe that for i, j ∈ N,
∆ij(ti; yi(ti)) =
|θ|
|Si|
∑
s∈Si
1 {j ∈ Ns\{i}}
Ns − 1 ,
for all j ∈ N. Only those players who belong to at least one of player i’s reference groups are
strategically relevant to player i. Using this, we construct λi,ρ(ti) as the following form:
|θ|
√√√√− log ρ
2
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
1
|Si|
∑
s∈Si
1 {j ∈ Ns\{i}}
Ns − 1
)2
.
Those players with large reference groups tend to have negligible hindsight regrets.
4. The Econometrician’s Observations and Testable Implications
4.1. The Econometrician’s Observations. We assume that the econometrician observes
(Y,X), where Y ∈ AN is an N -dimensional vector of actions by N players and X is an
N × dX matrix whose i-th row is X>i , where Xi is a subvector of Ti, and represents an
observed covariate vector of player i.
Assumption 3 (The Econometrician’s Observation): (i) The distribution of (Y, T )
is equal to P y associated with a pure strategy equilibrium y.
(ii) For each i ∈ N, Ti = (ηi, Xi), where Xi ∈ RdX is observed but ηi ∈ H ⊂ Rdη is not
observed by the econometrician.
(iii) For each i ∈ N, ηi is conditionally independent of C given Xi.
The distribution of (Y, T ) that the econometrician focuses on stems from the Nature’s ob-
jective probability P and a pure strategy equilibrium y. When there are multiple equilibria,
the econometrician does not know which equilibrium the vector of observed outcomes Y is
associated with. The players’ subjective beliefs affect the distribution of (Y, T ) through their
impact on the associated equilibrium y.
Assumption 3(ii) specifies that Ti involves components ηi and Xi which are unobserved
and observed by the econometrician respectively. Thus the econometrician may not observe
part of the type information each player has.
To appreciate Assumption 3(iii), for each s = 1, · · ·, S, let the set Ns ⊂ N denote the
collection of i’s such that all the players in Ns belong to reference group s. Suppose further
that
(4.1) ηi = ϕs(η˜i, Us) and Xi = (X˜i, Zs),
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where η˜i is an unobserved idiosyncratic component, Us is an unobserved group-specific com-
ponent, X˜i and Zs are observed idiosyncratic and group-specific components, and ϕs is an
unobserved nonstochastic map. Furthermore, we specify that
(4.2) Cs = (Us, Zs) and Us = hs(Zs),
where hs is a nonstochastic function unknown to the econometrician. We assume that
(η˜i, X˜i)’s are conditionally independent (across i’s) given C = (Cs)
S
s=1, so that Assumption
1 may hold. The unobserved group specific characteristics Us are incorporated in the unob-
served heterogeneity ηi, and are sources of their within-group correlation. Now Assumption
3(iii) requires that this within-group correlation among the unobserved components ηi is
fully controlled by the observed group characteristics part of Xi. This condition is satisfied,
for example, if Us is an unknown function of Zs, as in (4.2). Hence Assumption 3 allows for
unobserved group characteristics in a limited way.9
We introduce parametrization of unobserved heterogeneity ηi and payoffs.
Assumption 4 (Parametrization of Unobserved Heterogeneity and Payoffs):
For all i ∈ N, ti ∈ T, and a ∈ AN ,
P {ηi ≤ ti|Xi} = Gθ0 (ti|Xi) and ui(a; ti) = ui,θ0(a; ti),
where θ0 ∈ Θ ⊂ Rd, and Gθ(·|Xi) and ui,θ(·; ti) are parametrized by θ ∈ Θ.
Assumption 4 assumes that the conditional CDF of ηi given Xi and the payoff function
are parametrized by a finite dimensional vector θ ∈ Θ. A notable feature of the assumption
is that while ηi is allowed to involve unobserved group characteristic Us, the econometrician
does not need to specify parametrically the way Us in (4.1) is related to Xi. More specifically,
write
P {ηi ≤ ti|Xi} =
∫
P {ηi ≤ ti|Xi, Us = us} dF (us|Xi),
where F (·|Xi) is the conditional CDF of Us given Xi. One does not need to parametrically
specify the conditional distribution of ηi given Xi and Us or the conditional distribution of
Us given Xi. For this paper’s method, it suffices to parametrically specify the conditional
distribution of ηi given Xi.
It is worth noting that Assumptions 3-4 are concerned only with the primitives of the
game. They do not impose restrictions on the equilibrium y or the way the agents’ beliefs
are formed in equilibrium. The assumptions are only concerned with the Nature’s objective
probability P .
9See Brock and Durlauf (2007) for partial identification results for discrete-choice based social interactions
models with unobserved group specific characteristics.
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4.2. Testable Implications from Belief-Free Hindsight Regrets. We derive testable
implications by using Theorem 1. For simplicity, we write u∆i (a¯) = ui,θ0(a¯, Y−i;Ti)−ui,θ0(1−
a¯, Y−i;Ti), a¯ ∈ A, suppressing Y−i and Ti and θ0 from the notation.
Since Y = y(T ) for some pure strategy Nash equilibrium y, for all values of Ti such that
Yi = 1, we have E
y
i
[
u∆i |Ti
] ≥ 0, i.e.,
(4.3) 1 {Yi = 1} ≤ 1
{
Eyi
[
u∆i (1)|Ti
] ≥ 0} .
Similarly, for all values of Ti such that Yi 6= 1, we have Yi = 0 so that Eyi
[
u∆i |Ti
] ≤ 0. In
other words, we have
(4.4) 1 {Yi 6= 1} ≤ 1
{
Eyi
[
u∆i (1)|Ti
] ≤ 0} .
We take conditional expectations (given Xi) of both sides in (4.3) and (4.4), and deduce that
for each i ∈ N,
(4.5) 1− pi∗i,L ≤ P {Yi = 1|Xi} ≤ pi∗i,U ,
where pi∗i,U ≡ P
{
Eyi
[
u∆i (1)|Ti
] ≥ 0|Xi} and pi∗i,L ≡ P {Eyi [u∆i (1)|Ti] ≤ 0|Xi} .
Unfortunately, the inequalities in (4.5) cannot be directly used in our set-up for infer-
ence for two reasons. First, the bounds involve heterogeneous subjective beliefs which the
econometrician has difficulty recovering from the observations. Second, the probabilities
in both bounds of (4.5) cannot be simulated, because the bounds depend on the unknown
distribution of Y−i which is a nonprimitive quantity. We use Theorem 1 to address both
issues.
First let λi,ρ(ti, a¯), a¯ ∈ A, denote λi,ρ(ti) except that ∆ij(ti; yi(ti)) in its definition is
replaced by ∆ij(ti; a¯). Define
(4.6) γi(a¯) ≡ 1
{
u∆i (a¯) ≥ −λi,ρ(Ti, a¯)
}
and
Hi,U ≡ {ηi ∈ H : γi (1) = 1} and Hi,L ≡ {ηi ∈ H : γi (0) = 1} .
Using this, we construct probabilities:
(4.7) pii,U ≡ P {ηi ∈ Hi,U |Xi, Y−i} and pii,L ≡ P {ηi ∈ Hi,L|Xi, Y−i} .
Unlike pi∗i,U and pi
∗
i,L, these probabilities can be simulated, as explained at the end of this
subsection.
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We define
ei,L ≡ P {Yi = 1|Xi} −
(
1− 1
1− ρi
· pii,L
)
and(4.8)
ei,U ≡ P {Yi = 1|Xi} − 1
1− ρi
· pii,U ,
where ρi ≡ ρ1{maxti∈T λi,ρ(ti, 1) > 0}.
To construct testable implications, we choose a vector of nonnegative functions gi =
(gi1, · · ·, giL)> : R→ [0,∞)L. One may conjecture moment inequalities in a spirit similar to
Andrews and Shi (2013) as follows:
(4.9)
1
N
N∑
i=1
ei,Lgi(Xi) ≥ 0 and 1
N
N∑
i=1
ei,Ugi(Xi) ≤ 0.
However, Theorem 1 does not imply the inequalities in (4.9), because we are using pii,U and
pii,L in (4.8) instead of
(4.10) P {ηi ∈ Hi,U |Xi} and P {ηi ∈ Hi,L|Xi} .
We introduce wL,wU ∈ RL+, and define the event that the moment inequalities hold:
M(wU ,wL) ≡
{
1
N
∑N
i=1 ei,Lgi(Xi) + wL ≥ 0
1
N
∑N
i=1 ei,Ugi(Xi)−wU ≤ 0
}
.
It remains to find good bounds wL and wU such that the probability ofM(wU ,wL) becomes
sufficiently large, so that the moment inequalities serve as testable implications from Theorem
1.
Theorem 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then for any τ ∈ (0, 1),
(4.11) P [M(wτ ,U(X),wτ ,L(X))|X] ≥ 1− τ
2
(1{δU(X) > 0}+ 1{δL(X) > 0}) ,
almost everywhere, where wτ ,U(X), wτ ,L(X), δU(X) and δL(X) are as defined in (4.14)
below.
To define wτ ,U(X), wτ ,L(X), δU(X) and δL(X), we first note that pii,L and pii,U are non-
stochastic functions of (Y−i, Xi) from (4.7). We make explicit the dependence by writing pii,L
and pii,U as pii,L(Y−i, Xi) and pii,U(Y−i, Xi). Define
djl,L =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Vj (pii,L(·, Xi)) gil(Xi)
1− ρi
and(4.12)
djl,U =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Vj (pii,U(·, Xi)) gil(Xi)
1− ρi
,
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where Vj (pii,L(·, Xi)) and Vj (pii,U(·, Xi)) are maximal variations of pii,L(·, Xi) and pii,U(·, Xi)
along the coordinate j. These variations determine the maximal approximation error due to
the use of pii,U and pii,L instead of the conditional probabilities in (4.10). We let dL,j and dU,j
be L dimensional column vectors whose entries are given by djl,L and djl,U , with l = 1, · · ·, L
keeping the same order as in the construction of ei,Lgi(Xi). Then define L× L matrices:
(4.13) D˜L(X) =
∑
j∈N
dL,jd
>
L,j and D˜U(X) =
∑
j∈N
dU,jd
>
U,j.
Let DL(X) and DU(X) be the same as D˜L(X) and D˜U(X) except that the zero entries are
replaced by a small number η > 0. Define for each τ ∈ (0, 1),
wτ ,L(X) ≡
√
− 1
2δL(X)
log
(τ
2
)
DL(X)rL(X), and(4.14)
wτ ,U(X) ≡
√
− 1
2δU(X)
log
(τ
2
)
DU(X)rU(X),
where δL(X) and δU(X) are Perron-Frobenius eigenvalues of DL(X) and DU(X) and rL(X)
and rU(X) are associated nonnegative eigenvectors (normalized to have the Euclidean norm
1).10 As we parametrize the payoff function and the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
(Assumption 4), we can often derive the explicit form of the matrices D˜L(X) and D˜U(X).
This is explained in detail in the supplemental note to this paper.
Let us consider the simulation of pii,U and pii,L. By Assumptions 3-4, we can rewrite
(4.15) pii,U ≡
∫
Hi,U
dGθ(ηi|Xi) and pii,L ≡
∫
Hi,L
dGθ(ηi|Xi).
The integrals can be either evaluated explicitly, or simulated by drawing ηi from Gθ(·|Xi).
For example, consider the payoff differential for each player i:
ui(1, a−i;Ti)− ui(0, a−i;Ti) = v1,i + v2,i
Ns − 1
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
aj − ηi,
10The small number η > 0 in the definition of DL(X) and DU (X) is introduced to make sure that the
matrices are irreducible, so that by Perron-Frobenius Theorem (e.g. Theorem 8.2 of Serre (2010), p.151)
positive eigenvalues δL(X) and δU (X) and positive eigenvectors rL(X) and rU (X) exist. In practice, one
may take any nominally positive number such as 10−16, depending on the machine precision. Any fixed
choice of η > 0 does not affect the validity of the results in this paper. A matlab program that computes the
Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue and eigenvector for an irreducible matrix is available on the Mathworks website.
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where Ns = |Ns|, v1,i ≡ v1,θ1 (Xi), and v2,i ≡ v2,θ2 (Xi), for some parametric functions v1,θ1 ,
and v2,θ2 . Then, for i ∈ Ns,
pii,U = Gθ
v1,i + v2,i
Ns − 1
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
Yj + λi,ρ|Xi
 and
pii,L = 1−Gθ
v1,i + v2,i
Ns − 1
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
Yj − λi,ρ|Xi
 ,
where λi,ρ is a belief-free hindsight regret given by
λi,ρ =
|v2,i|√
Ns − 1
√
−1
2
log ρ
as in (3.8). Hence there is no need to resort to simulations in this case. From the explicit
form of pii,U and pii,L, we can derive dil,U and dil,L explicitly. See the supplemental note for
details.
In general, the inequality restrictions in (4.11) become weaker, when λi,ρ(Ti, a¯) is larger,
i.e., the strategic relevance of the players among each other is stronger. This is a cost to the
econometrician for not being able to recover fully the beliefs of individual players despite
strong strategic interactions among them.
5. Bootstrap Inference and Asymptotic Validity
For inference, we compare the actual actions of the players and their predicted actions
conditional on X. We pursue an inference procedure that is robust to any type distribution
P chosen for the Nature’s experiment and any configurations of subjective beliefs (within
the boundary set by Assumptions 1-2), and any pure strategy equilibrium among multiple
equilibria. To make the notion of robustness precise, we let P0 be the collection of type
distributions P chosen by the Nature such that they satisfy Assumptions 1-4. We let Q
be the collection of all the subjective belief profiles Q = (Q1, · · ·, QN) such that each Qi
satisfies Assumptions 1-2. For each Q ∈ Q, let YQ be the set of pure strategy equilibria
associated with a given subjective belief Q. Then the set Y ≡ ∪Q∈QYQ includes any pure
strategy equilibrium associated with any belief profile Q in Q. We let P be the collection of
the joint distributions of (Y,X), with Y = y(T ), as the distribution P of T = (η,X) runs in
P0 and y runs in Y . We search for an inference procedure that is robust against any choice
of distributions in P for (Y,X).
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We define
ri,L(θ) ≡ 1{Yi = 1} −
(
1− 1
1− ρi
· pii,L
)
and(5.1)
ri,U(θ) ≡ 1{Yi = 1} − 1
1− ρi
· pii,U .
Then, we define
(5.2) lU(θ) ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
ri,U(θ)gi(Xi) and lL(θ) ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
ri,L(θ)gi(Xi).
Using lU(θ) and lL(θ), we take the following as our test statistic:
(5.3) T (θ) = N
∥∥[lU(θ)−wτ ,U(X)]+ + [lL(θ)−wτ ,L(X)]−∥∥2 ,
where for x = (x1, · · ·, xd)> ∈ Rd, [x]+ = [max{xj, 0}]dj=1 and [x]− = [max{xj, 0}]dj=1.
Although the test statistic takes a similar form as in many researches in the literature of
moment inequalities (e.g. Rosen (2008), Andrews and Soares (2010), and Andrews and Shi
(2013) among others), the sample moments lU(θ) and lL(θ) here are not necessarily the sum
of independent or conditionally independent random variables. The summands ri,U(θ)gi(Xi)
and ri,L(θ)gi(Xi) involve Y−i, and are dependent across i’s in a complicated manner.
We use Theorem 2 to deal with this issue. First, we write
(5.4) lU(θ) = ζ +
1
N
N∑
i=1
ei,Ugi(Xi),
where ζ ≡ 1
N
∑N
i=1 r
∗
i gi(Xi) and r
∗
i ≡ 1{Yi = 1}−P{Yi = 1|Xi}. Writing lL(θ) similarly and
applying Theorem 2, we deduce that with probability at least 1− τ ,
(5.5) [lU(θ)−wτ ,U(X)]+ + [lL(θ)−wτ ,L(X)]− ≤ [ζ]+ + [ζ]− = |ζ|,
where for x = (x1, · · ·, xd)> ∈ Rd, |x| = (|x1|, · · ·, |xd|)>.
We base the inference on the asymptotic distribution of ζ. Using Assumption 1, one can
show that ζ is the sum of martingale difference arrays. Under some regularity conditions,
the martingale central limit theorem gives us the following: as N →∞,
(5.6)
√
Nζ
D→ V 1/2Z,
where Z is a random vector distributed as N (0, I) and V 1/2 is a positive definite random
matrix independent of Z.
It remains to obtain an approximate distribution of V 1/2Z that we can use for actual
inference. Asymptotic inference involving martingale difference arrays typically adopts ran-
dom norming to pivotize the test statistic. However, this is not possible in our case for two
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reasons. First, the matrix V 1/2 involves P{Yi = 1|Xi = ·}’s which are heterogeneous across
i’s. Second, the test is on multiple inequality restrictions rather than equality restrictions.
Thus, we cannot pivotize the test, for example, by using an inverse covariance matrix.
To deal with this situation, we first propose a benchmark method of constructing bootstrap
critical values that are asymptotically valid, computationally efficient, and yet conservative.
Then we turn to the case of asymptotically negligible hindsight regrets, and develop a way
to improve the inference at the cost of additional computational cost.
5.1. Benchmark Bootstrap. We first draw εi,b’s with i = 1, · · ·, N, and b = 1, · · ·, B, from
N(0, 1) independently and identically distributed across i’s, and b’s. Consider the following
bootstrap test statistic:
T ∗b ≡
∥∥∥∥∥ 1√N
N∑
i=1
Zˆiεi,b
∥∥∥∥∥
2
, b = 1, · · ·, B,
where Zˆi is a column vector with entries
Zˆil ≡ 1{Yi = 1}gil(Xi)− 1
N
N∑
k=1
1{Yk = 1}gkl(Xk), l = 1, · · ·, L
Let c∗1−α,B be the (1−α+τ(θ))-th percentile of the bootstrap test statistics T ∗b , b = 1, 2, ···, B,
where
(5.7) τ(θ) =
τ
2
(
1
{
δ¯U(θ) > 0
}
+ 1
{
δ¯L(θ) > 0
})
,
δ¯U(θ) = supx∈RdX δU(x), and δ¯L(θ) = supx∈RdX δL(x). The confidence set for θ ∈ Θ is
defined to be
(5.8) CB =
{
θ ∈ Θ : T (θ) ≤ max{c∗1−α,B, ε}
}
,
where ε > 0 is a fixed small number such as 0.001. The maximum with ε > 0 in the critical
value in CB is introduced to ensure the uniform validity of the bootstrap confidence set even
when the test statistic becomes degenerate. Conveniently, the critical value c∗1−α,B depends
on θ ∈ Θ only through τ(θ), not through the bootstrap test statistic T ∗b . This expedites
the computation of the confidence set substantially. The following theorem shows that the
bootstrap procedure is uniformly asymptotically valid.
Theorem 3: Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold and that there exists a constant Cg > 0
such that max1≤i≤N,1≤l≤L supx∈RdX |gil(x)| ≤ Cg. Then
liminf
N→∞
inf
P∈P
P {θ0 ∈ C∞} ≥ 1− α.
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The condition that max1≤i≤N supx∈RdX |gil(x)| ≤ Cg can be relaxed to include unbounded
gil’s. (See Theorem A3 in the appendix.)
To see the intuition of why the bootstrap method works, first note that for each θ ∈ Θ,
the distribution of T (θ) is first order stochastically dominated by that of
(5.9) N ‖[ζ]+ + [ζ]−‖2 = N ‖ζ‖2 ,
by (5.5). By comparing the variances, one can show that the asymptotic distribution of the
last quantity is again first order stochastically dominated by the asymptotic distribution of
(5.10)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1√N
N∑
i=1
Zi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
where Zi is an L× 1 column vector whose entries are
Zij ≡ 1{Yi = 1}gil(Xi)− E [1{Yi = 1}gil(Xi)|F ] , l = 1, · · ·, L,
and F is a certain sigma field contained in that of (X,C). The distribution of the last
sum is approximated by the conditional distribution of T ∗b given (Y,X) when N and B are
sufficiently large. Since
P{T ∗b > max{c∗1−α,B, ε}|Y,X} ≤ α,
by the definition of c∗1−α,B, we also have
P{T (θ) > max{c∗1−α,B, ε}|F} . α,
where . denotes inequality that holds in the limit. Hence taking the expectation on both
sides, we find that the bootstrap test is asymptotically valid.
The observations are cross-sectionally dependent due to the public signals Cs. Cameron,
Gelbach, and Miller (2008) proposed a wild bootstrap procedure for regression models with
clustered errors. It is worth comparing this paper’s wild bootstrap procedure with theirs.
Their wild bootstrap procedure requires that the simulated multipliers εi,b be group-specific.
We cannot apply their method here, because we do not require the number of the groups to
grow to infinity as the sample size increases. In contrast, this paper’s bootstrap procedure
remains valid regardless of whether the number of the groups is small or large. This is due
to our assumption that the within-group correlation is fully captured by the observed group
specific variables. (Assumption 3(iii).) Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) do not make
such an assumption.
5.2. Modified Bootstrap. When the hindsight regrets are negligible for which we provide
a precise condition below, we can obtain an improved inference method. We consider the
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following bootstrap test statistic:
TMod∗b (θ) ≡ N
∥∥∥[l∗U,b(θ)]+ + [l∗L,b(θ)]−∥∥∥2 , b = 1, · · ·, B,
where
l∗U,b(θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(ri,U(θ)gi(Xi)) εi,b and
l∗L,b(θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(ri,L(θ)gi(Xi)) εi,b.
We take cMod∗1−α,B(θ) to be the (1 − α + τ(θ))-th percentile of the bootstrap test statistics
TMod∗b (θ), b = 1, 2, · · ·, B, and define the confidence set for θ ∈ Θ to be
CModB =
{
θ ∈ Θ : T (θ) ≤ max{cMod∗1−α,B(θ), ε}
}
.
The following theorem shows that the confidence set is asymptotically valid under appropri-
ate conditions.
Theorem 4: Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 3 hold and as N →∞,
(5.11) max
1≤l≤L
sup
P∈P
E
[
N∑
i=1
(
d2jl,L + d
2
jl,U
) |C]→ 0,
where djl,L’s and djl,U ’s are as defined in (4.12). Then,
liminf
N→∞
inf
P∈P
P
{
θ0 ∈ CMod∞
} ≥ 1− α.
To see how this method achieves validity, let us assume for simplicity that L = 1. We
write
(5.12)
√
N l∗U,b(θ) =
1√
N
N∑
i=1
ri,U(θ)gi,1(Xi)εi,b.
The conditional variance of the last term given (Y,X) is equal to
1
N
N∑
i=1
(r∗i + ei,U)
2 g2i,1(Xi) ≈
1
N
N∑
i=1
r∗2i g
2
i,1(Xi) +
1
N
N∑
i=1
e2i,Ug
2
i,1(Xi),
for large N , where the cross-product terms can be shown to disappear when the hindsight
regrets are asymptotically negligible. The leading sum in the last display is the conditional
variance of
√
Nζ. Hence the conditional variance of
√
N l∗U,b(θ) is asymptotically larger than
the conditional variance of
√
Nζ. Using a similar analysis for
√
N l∗L,b(θ), we find that the
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bootstrap distribution of
√
N{[l∗U,b(θ)]+ + [l∗L,b(θ)]−} first order stochastically dominates
that of
√
N |ζ|, when N is large. Hence using TMod∗b (θ) yields a bootstrap critical value that
is asymptotically valid.
Condition (5.11) summarizes what we eventually need through asymptotically negligible
hindsight regrets. For example, consider a large game with social interactions with the equal
weight wj,s = 1/(Ns − 1) in Section 2.3.2, and for simplicity assume that the distribution
of Xi is concentrated on a bounded set, and that the payoff differential u
∆
i is additive in ηi
whose conditional CDF given Xi has a bounded density. Then we can show that
max
1≤k,l≤L
sup
P∈P
E
[
N∑
j=1
(
d2jl,L + d
2
jl,U
)
g2jk(Xj)
]
= O(N−1),
as N → ∞, satisfying the condition in (5.11). Thus when the hindsight regrets are asymp-
totically negligible, the condition in (5.11) is met usually.
To see when this modified method achieves improvement, we note that
(5.13)
√
N l∗U,b(θ) =
1√
N
N∑
i=1
(ri,U(θ)gi(Xi)) εi,b =
√
Nζ∗ +
1√
N
N∑
i=1
(ei,Ugi(Xi)) εi,b,
where ζ∗ ≡ 1
N
∑N
i=1 (r
∗
i gi(Xi)) εi,b. Suppose that the hindsight regrets turn out to be asymp-
totically negligible. In many examples, this means that the last sum is distributionally close
to degenerate at zero.11 Since the bootstrap distribution of
√
Nζ∗ approximates the dis-
tribution of
√
Nζ, and the last sum in (5.13) is small, we follow the same arguments for√
N l∗L,b(θ) and find that the bootstrap distribution of T
Mod∗
b (θ) approximates the distribu-
tion of ||√Nζ||2 which we noted previously is stochastically dominated by the bootstrap
distribution of T ∗b . Therefore, the bootstrap distribution of T
Mod∗
b (θ) is first order stochasti-
cally dominated by that of T ∗b , yielding a lower bootstrap critical value than that based on
T ∗b . This is the potential source of power improvement.
In many situations, one needs to make inference about a subvector θ1 of the parameter
vector θ = (θ1, θ2), where θ2 denotes the nuisance parameter. Following what Bugni, Canay
and Shi (2013) called the recycling approach, we may construct the bootstrap confidence set
as follows:
CMod1−α,B,1 =
{
θ1 ∈ Θ1 : T (θ1) ≤ max
{
cMod∗1−α,B(θ1), ε
}}
,
11For example, consider Example 2.2.1, where the hindsight regrets are asymptotically negligible as Ns →∞.
(See Section 3.3.1.) Suppose that wj,s = 1/(Ns − 1) there and the probability of a tie in equilibrium is zero.
Then ei,U is close to the difference between P{Eyi [u∆i (1)|Ti] ≥ 0|Xi} and P{u∆i (1) ≥ −λi,ρ(Ti)|Y−i, Xi}. Since
λi,ρ(Ti) is small and u
∆
i (1) depends on Y−i only through the within group proportion
1
Ns−1
∑
i∈Ns\{i} Yi,
this difference becomes negligible by Assumptions 1 and 2.
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where T (θ1) ≡ infθ2∈Θ2 T (θ1, θ2) and
cMod∗1−α,B(θ1) ≡ inf
θ2∈Θ2
cMod∗1−α,B(θ1, θ2),
with cMod∗1−α,B(θ) being constructed as before. See Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2013) for more
details.
6. Monte Carlo Simulation Studies
6.1. Basic Data Generating Processes. We consider S number of private information
Bayesian games, where each game s is populated by Ns number of players. The action space
for each player is {0, 1}. The i-th player in game s = 1, · · ·, S has the following form of a
payoff differential:
(6.1) ui(1, a−i;Ti)− ui(0, a−i;Ti) = Xi,sβ0 + φ0
(
1
Ns − 1
Ns∑
j=1,j 6=i
aj
)
+ ηi,s,
where Xi,s and ηi,s are observable and unobservable characteristics of player i. The payoff
specification is often used in the literature of social interactions, where φ0 measures the
presence of social interactions. The payoff specification and private information assumption
imply the following form of belief-free hindsight regret for player i in game s :
(6.2) λi,ρ(Ti) =
√
− φ
2
0
Ns − 1
log ρ
2
.
In simulations, we specified
(6.3) Xi,s = Zi,s + γ0Cs − 0.2,
where Zi,s is an idiosyncratic component and Cs is a public signal that is specific to group
s. The random variables ηi,s, Zi,s, and Cs are drawn independently from N(0, 1), and Zi,s’s
are independent across i’s and s’s and Cs’s are independent across s’s.
To generate outcomes in equilibrium, we draw c from the distribution of Cs, and find a
solution for ps(c) = P{Yi = 1|Cs = c} for each value c from the equilibrium constraints and
then generate Xi,s(c) = Zi,s + γ0c − 0.2 and Yi,s = 1
{
Xi,s(c)β0 + φ0 · ps(c) + ηi,s ≥ 0
}
by
drawing (Zi,s, ηi,s) from its specified distribution for i ∈ Ns. For the simulations, we assume
that each game has the same number of players (denoted by Ns.)
For the construction of moment inequalities, we used the following:
g1(Xi,s) = 1, g2(Xi,s) = |Xi,s|, g3(Xi,s) = 1{Xi,s ≥ 0}, and
g4(Xi,s) = |Xi,s|+ 1{Xi,s ≥ 0}.
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Throughout the simulation studies, we chose ρ = 0.01, τ = 0.01, γ0 = 1/3, and β0 = 1. We
set the Monte Carlo and bootstrap simulation numbers to be 1,000.
6.2. Finite Sample Coverage Probabilities of Bootstrap Tests. We first investigate
the finite sample validity of the confidence intervals. For this study, we choose φ0 from
{0, 0.5}. Since the belief-free hindsight regret in (6.2) is increasing in φ0, we expect that
as φ0 moves away from zero, the hindsight regret becomes higher, sending the moment
inequalities away from being binding, and ultimately the confidence set will become more
conservative. The main interest here is to investigate how conservative the confidence set
becomes in finite samples.
Table 1 reports finite sample coverage probabilities. The benchmark bootstrap confidence
set gives conservative finite sample coverage probabilities even when φ0 = 0, i.e. there
is no hindsight regret. This is because the stochastic dominance of N ||ζ||2 in (5.9) by
||N−1/2∑Ni=1 Zi||2 in (5.10) remains in force even in the absence of hindsight regret.
Table 1: Finite Sample Coverage Probabilities at 95%
(Small S Relative to Large Ns)
Benchmark Modified
φ0= 0.0 φ0= 0.5 φ0= 0.0 φ0= 0.5
S = 10 Ns= 100 1.000 1.000 0.948 1.000
Ns= 300 1.000 1.000 0.943 1.000
S = 50 Ns= 100 1.000 1.000 0.951 1.000
Ns= 300 1.000 1.000 0.955 1.000
Table 2: Finite Sample Coverage Probabilities at 95%
(Small Ns Relative to Large S)
Benchmark Modified
φ0= 0.0 φ0= 0.5 φ0= 0.0 φ0= 0.5
S = 100 Ns= 30 1.000 1.000 0.947 1.000
S = 300 Ns= 30 0.999 1.000 0.949 1.000
On the other hand, the confidence sets from the modified bootstrap exhibit nonconser-
vative coverage probabilities. However, this modified method also becomes conservative as
φ0 moves away from zero, as we move further into the interior of the moment inequality
restrictions.
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The asymptotic justification for the modified bootstrap procedure requires that the hind-
sight regrets be asymptotically negligible. From the payoff specification, this asymptotic
negligibility arises when Ns is large. Now we check if the performance changes when we
consider small Ns relative to large S. We chose S ∈ {100, 300} and Ns = 30. The results
of Table 2 are similar to those of Table 1. Thus the validity of the bootstrap method is
not much affected by whether we choose small Ns with large S or small S with large Ns,
which echoes the fact that the asymptotic validity of the bootstrap test does not rely on a
particular way the ratio S/Ns behaves in the limit, as long as N →∞.
One might think that when the hindsight regrets are asymptotically negligible, we may
ignore the hindsight regrets altogether in constructing a test statistic. This is tantamount
to assuming that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium that the econometrician observes is in fact
an ex post Nash equilibrium, where the equilibrium strategies remain an equilibrium even
after all the types are revealed to the players. However, when the equilibrium behind the
observed outcomes is not necessarily an ex post Nash equilibrium, ignoring hindsight regrets
can lead to invalid inference in general. (See Table 2 below.) 12
Table 3: Finite Sample Coverage Probabilities at 90%
(Hindsight Regrets Ignored)
Benchmark Modified
φ0= −0.5 φ0= −1.0 φ0= −0.5 φ0= −1.0
S = 10 Ns= 100 0.992 0.985 0.882 0.837
Ns= 300 0.984 0.877 0.874 0.827
S = 50 Ns= 100 0.990 0.977 0.868 0.814
Ns= 300 0.995 0.877 0.985 0.839
S = 100 Ns= 30 0.997 0.977 0.876 0.825
S = 300 0.995 0.977 0.879 0.842
Table 3 reports the finite sample coverage probabilities of the bootstrap tests when the
hindsight regrets are entirely ignored in the construction of the test statistic. Here we
set γ0,1 = 0 and β0 = 1. The table shows that the finite sample coverage probabilities
of the benchmark deteriorate when the hindsight regrets are ignored, as φ0 becomes more
negative, when S is small relative to Ns. The deterioration is substantially severe for the
12In this simulation design, the average partial effect (without considering the endogenous effect from equilib-
rium) on the conditional choice probability with respect to φ0 is roughly around 0.135-0.137 (with P{Yi = 1}
ranging from 0 to 1) when φ0 = 0.5, and around 0.235-0.273, when φ0 = 1.0.
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modified bootstrap approach. Therefore, even when the hindsight regrets are asymptotically
negligible, one cannot simply set it to be zero for valid inference in general.13
Figure 1. The False Coverage Probability of the Confidence Intervals for φ0
at 95% with S = 10. The dotted line is from the benchmark bootstrap method
and the solid line is from the modified bootstrap method. The recycling approach of
Canay, Bugni and Shi (2013) was used for subvector inference. The x-axis represents
the hypothesized value of φ. As φ is away from the true value, the hindsight regret
tends to become larger, though not monotonously. When the within-group size Ns
increases to 300, we observe conspicuous improvement by the modified bootstrap.
Note that the confidence intervals (from the modified bootstrap) for φ0 include 0
with close to zero probability when φ0 = 0.5 or 1. Also, note that the false coverage
probability shows good performance when φ0 = 0.5 and φ0 = 1.0 and Ns = 300,
despite the fact that the coverage probabilities were observed to be 1 in Tables 1-2.
13When we took φ0 to be a positive number, the coverage probability deterioration did not arise.
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6.3. Finite Sample Power of the Bootstrap Tests for Parameter Values. We saw
that as φ0 moves away from zero, the coverage probability tends to be very conservative.
Now we investigate the finite sample power properties.
We first consider inference of φ0. The nominal coverage probability is set to be at 95%,
and the number of the information groups are set to be 10. The subvector inference is based
on the recycling approach of Canay, Bugni, and Shi (2013).
The results are shown in Figure 1. The x-axis represents the hypothesized value of φ under
the null hypothesis. The upper row panels use the true value of φ0 = 0.0, 0.5, and 1.0, with
the group size Ns = 100. And the lower row panels use the same values of φ0, but with a
larger group size Ns = 300.
From Figure 1, the bootstrap results show higher false coverage probability rates as φ0
moves away from zero, and substantial improvement by the modified bootstrap procedure,
and this improvement is further enhanced when Ns is increased from 100 to 300.
There are two notable features. First, when φ0 = 0.5 and Ns = 300, we saw that the
coverage probabilities were equal to one in Tables 1-2, suggesting extreme conservativeness of
the procedure. However, Figure 1 shows that even in this case, the false coverage probabilities
are reasonably low as φ moves away from zero. This emphasizes the fact that the conservative
coverage probabilities (or conservative size properties) do not necessarily imply trivial or
weak power properties in finite samples.
Second, when φ0 is either 0.5 or 1, the false coverage probability at value 0 is almost
zero. This means that when φ0 is away from zero, the confidence interval has almost zero
probability of covering 0. As φ0 is away from zero, the power of the bootstrap test (testing the
null hypothesis of φ0 = 0) naturally increases, but the moment inequalities also become more
conservative at the same time. Despite this conservativeness, the bootstrap test does not
lose power to detect the deviation from the null hypothesis of φ0 = 0. This has a significant
implication in empirical applications, because often we are interested in the presence of
strategic interactions among the players, and φ0 = 0 in this context means absence of such
interactions.
It is generally expected that the hindsight regret also affects the estimation of β0. Figure
2 shows the false coverage probabilities of confidence sets for β0. The results are similar.
The modified bootstrap outperforms substantially the benchmark method. Increasing the
group size Ns drastically improves the false coverage probability of the confidence sets.
We also investigated the situation where Ns is small relative to S. We chose S = 300
and Ns = 30. The results are shown in Figure 3. Unlike Figures 1-2, the false coverage
probabilities do not drastically increase as φ0 moves away from zero. Also, note that the
false coverage probability at 0 value of φ0 is almost zero when φ0 = 0.5, suggesting a good
power to detect the violation of the null hypothesis φ0 = 0.
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Figure 2. The False Coverage Probability of the Confidence Intervals for φ0
at 95% with S = 10. The dotted line is from the benchmark bootstrap method
and the solid line is from the modified bootstrap method. The recycling approach of
Canay, Bugni and Shi (2013) was used for subvector inference. The x-axis represents
the hypothesized value of φ. As φ is away from the true value, the hindsight regret
tends to become larger, though not monotonously. When the within-group size Ns
increases to 300, we observe conspicuous improvement by the modified bootstrap.
Note that the confidence intervals (from the modified bootstrap) for φ0 include 0
with close to zero probability when φ0 = 0.5 or 1. Also, note that the false coverage
probability shows good performance when φ0 = 0.5 and φ0 = 1.0 and Ns = 300,
despite the fact that the coverage probabilities were observed to be 1 in Tables 1-2.
7. Conclusion
This paper focuses on a large Bayesian game perspective for social interactions models,
and develops an inference method that is robust to heterogeneous formation of beliefs among
the players. Utilizing the strategic interdependence among the players and the assumption of
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Figure 3. The False Coverage Probability of the Confidence Intervals for φ0
and β0 at 95% with S = 300 and Ns = 30. Unlike the case of small number of
groups (S = 10) in Figures 1-2, increase in φ0 does not drastically lead to an
increase in the false coverage probability of confidence intervals for φ0 and β0.
conditionally independent types, this paper derives testable implications from the equilibrium
constraints.
The framework proposed in this paper may have limitations in some applications for
several reasons. First, the framework assumes that the information groups are exogenously
given in the beginning of the game. This does not cause any problem, if the current game’s
types satisfy the conditional independence assumption given any information used by the
agents in the endogenous group formation that occurs prior to the game However, this
conditional independence assumption is violated when the agents observe the groups formed,
before entering the current game. Second, the framework assumes that the idiosyncratic
component of the types is not shared between two different players. This assumption excludes
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a large network model where the information flow among the agents can be highly complex.
Researches on both fronts require separate papers.
8. Appendix: Extension to Multinomial Action Sets
In this appendix, we show how the results of the main text can be extended to the case
with a multinomial action set, i.e., A = {a¯1, · · ·, a¯K}. We extend the results in both the cases
of ordered and unordered action sets. The specific forms of belief-free hindsight regrets and
testable implications for various parametric specification of payoff functions are found in the
supplemental note to this paper. The formal results in this appendix include Theorems 1-4
as special cases. To ease the comparison, the results here are labeled as Theorems A1-A4.
The full proofs are found in the supplemental note to this paper.
8.1. Belief-Free Hindsight Regrets. First, we extend the measure of strategic interde-
pendence. For i, j ∈ N, a¯′ ∈ A, and ti ∈ T, we define ∆ij(ti; a¯′) to be an |A| − 1 dimensional
column vector defined by
∆ij(ti; a¯
′) ≡ [Vj(u∆i (·; ti, a¯′, a¯))]a¯∈A\{a¯′} ,
where u∆i (a−i; ti, a¯
′, a¯) is player i’s payoff differential between choosing a¯′ and a¯, i.e.,
u∆i (a−i; ti, a¯
′, a¯) ≡ ui(a¯′, a−i; ti)− ui(a¯, a−i; ti).
Let u∆i (Y−i;Ti, Yi) be an (|A|−1)×1 vector whose entries are given by u∆i (Y−i;Ti, Yi, a¯) with
a¯ running in A\{Yi}. Given an equilibrium y, player i ∈ N, and small number ρ ∈ (0, 1), we
say that a nonnegative, R|A|−1-valued map λi,ρ(·) on T is a ρ-hindsight regret for player i, if
Qyi
{
u∆i (Y−i;Ti, Yi) ≥ −λi,ρ(Ti)|Ti
} ≥ 1− ρ, everywhere.
To characterize a belief-free hindsight regret, for each i ∈ N, first define
(8.1) Λ˜i(ti) ≡
∑
j∈N:j 6=i
∆ij(ti; yi(ti))∆ij(ti; yi(ti))
>.
Then, we choose a small η > 0 and let Λi(ti) be the same as Λ˜i(ti) except that zero entries by
replaced by η. All the entries of Λi(ti) are strictly positive for all ti ∈ T, so that by Perron-
Frobenius Theorem, there exist a unique Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue and an associated
eigenvector that has positive entries. We denote this eigenvector (normalized to have the
Euclidean norm 1) and the eigenvalue of Λi(ti) by vi(ti) and ψi(ti) respectively. We let
(8.2) λi,ρ(ti) ≡
√
− log ρ
2ψi(ti)
·Λi(ti)vi(ti).
Then the following theorem confirms that λi,ρ is ρ-hindsight regret.
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Theorem A1: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then for each pure strategy equilibrium
y, and each ρ ∈ (0, 1), λi,ρ(·) is a ρ-hindsight regret.
Furthermore, suppose that Assumption 2 holds with ρ > 0. Then,
P y
{
u∆i (Y−i;Ti, Yi) ≥ −λi,ρ(Ti)|Ti
} ≥ 1− ρ.
Let us see how λi,ρ becomes a ρ-hindsight regret. For any nonnegative vector v ∈ S+ ≡
{x ∈R|A|−1+ : ||x|| = 1}, and any c > 0, note that
Qi
{
u∆i (Y−i;Ti, Yi) ≤ −cΛi(Ti)v|Ti = ti
}
≤ Qi
{
u∆i (Y−i;Ti, Yi)− Eyi
[
u∆i (Y−i;Ti, Yi)|Ti
] ≤ −cΛi(Ti)v|Ti = ti}
≤ exp (−2c2v>Λi(ti)v) .
The first inequality follows by the Nash equilibrium constraint, and the second inequality by a
multivariate extension of McDiarmid’s inequality. (The multivariate extension is established
in the supplemental note to this paper.) To obtain a tight lower bound, we minimize the
last exponential bound over v ∈ S+ to obtain
(8.3) exp
(−2c2ψi(ti)) ,
where ψi(ti) is the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue of Λi(ti) and the maximizer vi(ti) ∈ S+ is
taken to be the associated eigenvector with positive entries. We equate the last bound in
(8.3) to ρ and solve the equation for c to obtain c(ti) =
√−(log ρ)/(2ψi(ti)). In other words,
the exponential bound in (3.6) becomes ρ, if we take c = c(ti) and v = vi(ti), and the desired
form of λi,ρ(ti) as in (8.2) follows.
8.2. Testable Implications. First let λi,ρ(ti, a¯) denote λi,ρ(ti) except that ∆ij(ti; yi(ti)) is
replaced by ∆ij(ti; a¯). Define also ui(a¯) = ui(a¯, Y−i;Ti). Define u∆i (a¯) to be the (|A| − 1)× 1
column vector whose entries are given by ui(a¯)− ui(c) with c running in A\{a¯}. Let
γi (a¯) ≡ 1
{
u∆i (a¯) ≥ −λi,ρ(Ti, a¯)
}
.
Using this, we construct probabilities that can be simulated: for a¯ ∈ A,
pii,U(a¯) ≡ P {ηi ∈ Hi,U (a¯) |Xi, Y−i} and pii,L(a¯) ≡ P {ηi ∈ Hi,L (a¯) |Xi, Y−i} ,
where
Hi,U (a¯) ≡ {ηi ∈ H : γi (a¯) = 1} and
Hi,L (a¯) ≡ {ηi ∈ H : ∃c ∈ A\{a¯} s.t. γi (c) = 1} .
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Given a¯ ∈ A, we define
ei,L(a¯) ≡ P {Yi = a¯|Xi} −
(
1− 1
1− ρi(a¯)
· pii,L(a¯)
)
and(8.4)
ei,U(a¯) ≡ P {Yi = a¯|Xi} − 1
1− ρi(a¯)
· pii,U(a¯),
where ρi(a¯) ≡ ρ1{maxti∈T ||λi,ρ(ti, a¯)|| > 0}.
As before, we choose a vector of nonnegative functions gi = (gi1, · · ·, giL)> : R→ [0,∞)L.
We introduce wL,wU ∈ RL(|A|−1)+ , and define the event that the moment inequalities hold:
M(wU ,wL) ≡
{
1
N
∑N
i=1 ei,L ⊗ gi(Xi) + wL ≥ 0
1
N
∑N
i=1 ei,L ⊗ gi(Xi)−wU ≤ 0
}
,
where ei,L and ei,U are |A|−1 dimensional vectors whose entries are ei,L(a¯) and ei,U(a¯) with a¯
running in A\{a¯1}, and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product, and a¯1 is a fixed element of A used
as a normalization. The following theorem is an extension of Theorem 2 to a multinomial
action set.
Theorem A2: Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then for any τ ∈ (0, 1),
P [M(wτ ,U(X),wτ ,L(X))|X] ≥ 1− τ
2
(1{δU(X) > 0}+ 1{δL(X) > 0}) ,
where the inequality holds almost everywhere, wτ ,U(X) and wτ ,L(X) and δU(X) and δL(X)
are as defined in and below (8.6).
To define wτ ,U(X), wτ ,L(X), δU(X) and δL(X), we first note that pii,L(a¯) and pii,U(a¯) are
nonstochastic functions of (Y−i, Xi). We make explicit the dependence by writing pii,L(a¯)
and pii,U(a¯) as pii,L(Y−i, Xi; a¯) and pii,U(Y−i, Xi; a¯). Define for j ∈ N,
djl,L(a¯) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Vj (pii,L(·, Xi; a¯)) gil(Xi)
1− ρi(a¯)
and(8.5)
djl,U(a¯) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Vj (pii,U(·, Xi; a¯)) gil(Xi)
1− ρi(a¯)
,
where Vj (pii,L(·, Xi; a¯)) and Vj (pii,U(·, Xi; a¯)) are maximal variations of pii,L(Y−i, Xi; a¯) and
pii,U(Y−i, Xi; a¯) in Yj. We let dL,j and dU,j be L(|A| − 1) dimensional column vectors whose
entries are given by djl,L(a¯) and djl,U(a¯), with a¯ running in A\{a¯1} and then l = 1, · · ·, L,
keeping the same order as in the construction of ei,L ⊗ gi(Xi). Then define L(|A| − 1) ×
L(|A| − 1) matrices:
(8.6) D˜L(X) =
∑
j∈N
dL,jd
>
L,j and D˜U(X) =
∑
j∈N
dU,jd
>
U,j.
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Let DL(X) and DU(X) be the same matrices as D˜L(X) and D˜U(X) except that the zero
entries are replaced by a small number η > 0.
Finally, let us define for each τ ∈ (0, 1),
wτ ,L(X) ≡
√
− 1
2δL(X)
log
(τ
2
)
DL(X)rL(X), and(8.7)
wτ ,U(X) ≡
√
− 1
2δU(X)
log
(τ
2
)
DU(X)rU(X),
where δL(X) and δU(X) are Perron-Frobenius eigenvalues of DL(X) and DU(X) and rL(X)
and rU(X) are associated positive eigenvectors.
8.3. Bootstrap Inference.
8.3.1. Benchmark Bootstrap. For each a¯ ∈ A, we define
ri,L(a¯; θ) ≡ 1{Yi = a¯} −
(
1− 1
1− ρi(a¯)
· pii,L(a¯)
)
and
ri,U(a¯; θ) ≡ 1{Yi = a¯} − 1
1− ρi(a¯)
· pii,U(a¯).
Let ri,U(θ) and ri,L(θ) be column vectors whose entries are ri,U(a¯; θ) and ri,L(a¯; θ) with a¯
running in A\{a¯1} just as ei,L(a¯)’s and ei,U(a¯)’s constitute ei,U and ei,L. Then, we define
lU(θ) ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
ri,U(θ)⊗ gi(Xi) and lL(θ) ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
ri,L(θ)⊗ gi(Xi).
Using lU(θ) and lL(θ), we take the following as our test statistic:
T (θ) = N
∥∥[lU(θ)−wτ ,U(X)]+ + [lL(θ)−wτ ,L(X)]−∥∥2 ,
where for x = (x1, · · ·, xd)> ∈ Rd, [x]+ = [max{xj, 0}]dj=1 and [x]− = [max{xj, 0}]dj=1.
We first draw εi,b’s with i = 1, · · ·, N, and b = 1, · · ·, B, from N(0, 1) independently and
identically distributed across i’s, and b’s. Consider the following bootstrap test statistic:
T ∗b ≡
∥∥∥∥∥ 1√N
N∑
i=1
Zˆiεi,b
∥∥∥∥∥
2
, b = 1, · · ·, B,
where Zˆi is a column vector with entries
Zˆil(a¯) ≡ 1{Yi = a¯}gil(Xi)− 1
N
N∑
k=1
1{Yk = a¯}gkl(Xk),
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with a¯ running in A\{a¯1} and l = 1, · · ·, L in the same order as in ri⊗ gi(Xi). Let c∗1−α,B be
the (1− α + τ(θ))-th percentile of the bootstrap test statistics T ∗b , b = 1, 2, · · ·, B, where
τ(θ) =
τ
2
(
1
{
δ¯U(θ) > 0
}
+ 1
{
δ¯L(θ) > 0
})
,
and δ¯U(θ) = supx∈RdX δU(x) and δ¯L(θ) = supx∈RdX δL(x). The confidence set for θ ∈ Θ is
defined to be
CB =
{
θ ∈ Θ : T (θ) ≤ max{c∗1−α,B, ε}
}
,
where ε > 0 is a fixed small number such as 0.001.
Theorem A3: Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold and that there exists a constant Cg > 0
such that
(8.8) P
{
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
max
1≤l≤L
|gil(Xi)|4|C
]
< Cg
}
= 1.
Then
liminf
N→∞
inf
P∈P
P {θ0 ∈ C∞} ≥ 1− α.
8.3.2. Modified Bootstrap. When the hindsight regrets are negligible, we can obtain an im-
proved inference method similarly as before. Let
TMod∗b (θ) ≡ N
∥∥∥[l∗U,b(θ)]+ + [l∗L,b(θ)]−∥∥∥2 , b = 1, · · ·, B,
where
l∗U,b(θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(ri,U(θ)⊗ gi(Xi)) εi,b and
l∗L,b(θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(ri,L(θ)⊗ gi(Xi)) εi,b.
We take cMod∗1−α,B(θ) to be the (1 − α + τ(θ))-th percentile of the bootstrap test statistics
TMod∗b (θ), b = 1, 2, · · ·, B, and define the confidence set for θ ∈ Θ to be
CModB =
{
θ ∈ Θ : T (θ) ≤ max{cMod∗1−α,B(θ), ε}
}
.
The following theorem specifies the condition of asymptotically negligible hindsight regrets,
and establishes the validity of the modified bootstrap confidence set CModB . Define for j ∈ N,
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for 1 ≤ l, k ≤ L and for a¯ ∈ A,
d˜j,lk,U(a¯) ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
Vj (pii,U(·, X, a¯)) gil(Xi)gik(Xi) and
d˜j,lk,L(a¯) ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
Vj (pii,U(·, X, a¯)) gil(Xi)gik(Xi).
Then we obtain the following result.
Theorem A4: Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 3 hold and as N →∞,
(8.9) max
a¯∈A
max
1≤k,l≤L
sup
P∈P
E
[
N∑
j=1
(
d˜2j,lk,L(a¯) + d˜
2
j,lk,U(a¯)
)
|C
]
→ 0.
Then,
liminf
N→∞
inf
P∈P
P
{
θ0 ∈ CMod∞
} ≥ 1− α.
When gil(·)’s are uniformly bounded by a constant, then the condition (8.9) can be replaced
by the following
(8.10) max
a¯∈A
max
1≤k,l≤L
sup
P∈P
E
[
N∑
j=1
(
d2jl,L(a¯) + d
2
jl,U(a¯)
) |C]→ 0,
where djl,L(a¯)’s and djl,U(a¯)’s are as defined in (8.5). In many examples of asymptotically
negligible hindsight regrets, both the conditions (8.9) and (8.10) are satisfied as we saw in
Section 5.2.
The intuition behind the workings of the modified bootstrap for games with general ac-
quaintance groups is similar to that we saw for binary actions in Section 5.2.
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Games with Heterogeneous Beliefs”
Kyungchul Song
Vancouver School of Economics, UBC
The supplemental note comprises three sections. The first section goes through various
examples of social interactions models. The examples also cover both the cases of ordered
action spaces and unordered action spaces. Examples of ordered action spaces are students’
effort levels, discrete amounts of firms’ investments, attention paid to media with different
intensity, etc. Examples of unordered action spaces are choice sets in multinomial decision
problems, such as choice of a school, a product, a location, or a candidate in elections. In
each example, we provide an explicit form of belief-free hindsight regret in Theorem A1 in
the appendix of the paper, and also show how the bounds in Theorem A2 there can also be
explicitly computed. One can get a concrete idea of how derivation works, so that one may
derive the bounds similarly for other examples that are not shown in this note, depending
on the particular applications.
The second section provides a formal statement of the multivariate version of McDiarmid’s
inequality. The proof is provided there. The precise form of this statement and the proof
have not appeared in the literature as far as the author is concerned, although the proof
follows with only a minor modification of the original proof of McDiarmid (1989).
The third section presents the full mathematical proofs of the results in the paper. The
results include the belief-free hindsight results in Theorem A1, the testable implications in
Theorem A2, and the bootstrap validity results in Theorems A3 and A4.
9. Illustration through Examples
9.1. Social Interactions: The Case of Binary Decisions. Consider a private informa-
tion large game in Example 2.3.1, where each player chooses an action from A = {0, 1}.
There are S disjoint information groups. The set of the players in each information group s
is denoted by Ns. The payoff differential for player i is given by
(9.1) ui(1, a−i;Ti)− ui(0, a−i;Ti) = v1,θ1 (Xi) +
v2,θ2 (Xi)
Ns − 1
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
aj − ηi,
where Ns = |Ns| for some parametric functions v1,θ1(Xi), and v2,θ2(Xi). In many applications,
one specifies v2,θ2(Xi) = θ2, and the parameter θ2 represents the significance of strategic
interdependence among the players. We assume that the unobserved heterogeneity ηi is
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independent of the observed covariate Xi and has a known CDF, say, G. We assume that
G has a symmetric (around zero) and quasiconcave density such as a centered normal or
logistic distribution.
The payoff differential in (9.1) facilitates computation of the explicit bounds in Theorem
2 as we see below. However, the distributional assumptions on ηi do not play any role
in determining the belief-free hindsight regrets in Theorem 1. This is simply because the
measure of strategic relevance ∆ij(ti; yi(ti)) (defined in (3.3)) does not involve ηi due to the
additive structure.
9.1.1. Belief Hindsight Regrets in Theorem 1. As for the hindsight regrets in Theorem 1, as
we saw in Section 3.3.1, we have:
(9.2) λi,ρ(Ti) =
|v2,θ2 (Xi) |√
Ns − 1
√
−1
2
log ρ.
For notational brevity, we put λ¯i,ρ = λi,ρ(Ti) from here on.
9.1.2. Bounds in Theorem 2. Now let us find wτ ,U(X) and wτ ,L(X) and δU(X) and δL(X)
in Theorem 2. By the additive structure in (9.1), we have
pii,U(Y−i, Xi) = G
(
v+1,i + v2,iY¯−i,s
)
and pii,L(Y−i, Xi) = 1−G
(
v−1,i + v2,iY¯−i,s
)
,
where we recall that G is the CDF of ηi, Y¯−i,s ≡ 1Ns−1
∑
j∈Ns\{i} Yj,
v+1,i ≡ v1,θ1 (Xi) + λ¯i,ρ,
v−1,i ≡ v1,θ1 (Xi)− λ¯i,ρ, and
v2,i ≡ v2,θ2 (Xi) .
We need to find maximal variations of pii,U and pii,L as we perturb Yj in Y¯−i,s, for each j 6= i.
Consider pii,U first. Choose player j 6= i and define Y¯−ij,s ≡ 1Ns−2
∑
k∈Ns\{i,j} Yk. Then
the maximal variation of pii,U solely due to the j-th player’s perturbation of his own action
becomes ∣∣∣∣G(v+1,i + v2,i(Ns − 2)Y¯−ij,sNs − 1 + v2,iNs − 1
)
−G
(
v+1,i +
v2,i(Ns − 2)Y¯−ij,s
Ns − 1
)∣∣∣∣ ,
because the player can choose either 0 or 1. In order to obtain the maximal variation of pii,U ,
we need to maximize the above difference over all the possible values that Y¯−ij,s. Note that
the sample mean Y¯−ij,s takes values from [0, 1]. Then we have
(9.3) Vj (pii,U(·, Xi)) ≤ sup
y∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣G(v+1,i + yhi + v2,iNs − 1
)
−G (v+1,i + yhi)∣∣∣∣ ,
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where
hi ≡ v2,i(Ns − 2)
Ns − 1 .
Similarly for pii,L, we find that
(9.4) Vj (pii,L(·, Xi)) ≤ sup
y∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣G(v−1,i + yhi + v2,iNs − 1
)
−G (v−1,i + yhi)∣∣∣∣ .
The inequalities (9.3) and (9.4) are due to the fact that we replace the supremum over the grid
points {0, 1/(Ns−2), 2/(Ns−2), · · ·, 1} by the supremum over [0, 1]. As we shall see shortly,
this replacement makes it possible to compute the explicit solution to the supremums, as we
assume that G has a symmetric (around zero) and quasiconcave density. Hence we do not
need to do the maximization over the set of grid points.
To obtain explicit solutions to the supremums in (9.3) and (9.4), we define for each a < b
and ∆ ∈ R,
(9.5) ϕs(∆; a, b) ≡ argmaxz∈[a,b]
∣∣∣∣G(z + ∆Ns − 1
)
−G (z)
∣∣∣∣ .
It is not hard to check that we have an explicit solution as follows:
ϕs(∆; a, b) = 1
{
− ∆
2(Ns − 1) < a
}
a
+1
{
a ≤ − ∆
2(Ns − 1) ≤ b
}(
− ∆
2(Ns − 1)
)
+1
{
b ≤ − ∆
2(Ns − 1)
}
b,
due to the symmetry and quasiconcavity of the density of G. Then let
z+i ≡
{
ϕs
(
v2,i; v
+
1,i, v
+
1,i + hi
)
, if hi ≥ 0
ϕs
(
v2,i; v
+
1,i + hi, v
+
1,i
)
, if hi < 0
and similarly,
z−i ≡
{
ϕs
(
v2,i; v
−
1,i, v
−
1,i + hi
)
, if hi ≥ 0
ϕs
(
v2,i; v
−
1,i + hi, v
−
1,i
)
, if hi < 0
.
The quantities z+i ’s are solutions to the maximization problem in (9.5) depending on whether
(a, b) = (v+1,i, v
+
1,i + hi) or (a, b) = (v
+
1,i + hi, v
+
1,i) which depends on whether hi ≥ 0 or not.
Similarly the quantities z−i ’s are solutions to the maximization problem in (9.5) depending
on whether (a, b) = (v−1,i, v
−
1,i + hi) or (a, b) = (v
−
1,i + hi, v
−
1,i). Therefore, we conclude that for
each j ∈ Ns\{i},
Vj (pii,U(·, Xi)) ≤
∣∣G (z+i + v2,i/(Ns − 1))−G (z+i )∣∣ and(9.6)
Vj (pii,L(·, Xi)) ≤
∣∣G (z−i + v2,i/(Ns − 1))−G (z−i )∣∣ ,
42 SONG
and for each j ∈ N\Ns,
Vj (pii,U(·, Xi)) = 0 and Vj (pii,L(·, Xi)) = 0,
because player j outside the information group s of player i cannot have an impact on
player i’s payoff differential. Note that the right hand side of (9.6) does not depend on j.
Substituting the right hand sides of (9.6) for Vj (pii,U(·, Xi)) and Vj (pii,L(·, Xi)) in (4.12) we
obtain
djl,U =
1
N
S∑
s=1
∑
i∈Ns
1 {j ∈ Ns\{i}}
∣∣G (z+i + v2,i/(Ns − 1))−G (z+i )∣∣ gil(Xi)
1− ρi
, and
djl,L =
1
N
S∑
s=1
∑
i∈Ns
1 {j ∈ Ns\{i}}
∣∣G (z−i + v2,i/(Ns − 1))−G (z−i )∣∣ gil(Xi)
1− ρi
,
with ρi ≡ ρ1{|v2,i| > 0}. (Replacing Vj (pii,U(·, Xi; a¯)) and Vj (pii,L(·, Xi; a¯)) by the right hand
sides of (9.6) makes the bounds in Theorem 2 slightly larger. We suggest this replacement
mainly due to its computational merit. The replacement does not affect the asymptotic
validity of the procedure regardless of whether Ns is large or small.)
Let dL,j and dU,j be L dimensional vector whose entries are given by djl,L and djl,U with
l = 1, · · ·, L. Using these vectors, define L× L matrices:
D˜L(X) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
dL,jd
>
L,j and D˜U(X) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
dU,jd
>
U,j.
Finally, we construct for a given small number τ ∈ (0, 1) wτ ,L(X) and wτ ,U(X) as in (4.14).
Note that when G has a bounded density, we have
N∑
j=1
E
[{
d2jl,U + d
2
jl,L
}
g2jk(Xj)|C
] ≤ C1
N(1− ρ)2
1
N
N∑
j=1
E
[
g2jl(Xj)g
2
jk(Xj)|C
]
,
for some constant C1 > 0. Therefore, under (8.8), the condition of Theorem 4 holds, so that
we can use the modified bootstrap procedure.
When |Ns| ≥ n for all s = 1, ···, S (so that all the information groups are of same size n) and
v2,θ2 (·) is bounded, we can check that λ¯i,ρ = O(n−1/2) (uniformly over 1 ≤ i ≤ N) everywhere
and both wτ ,L(X) and wτ ,U(X) are of order OP ((nS)
−1/2) = O(N−1/2) everywhere. As
n → ∞, λ¯i,ρ and wτ ,L(X) = wτ ,U(X) become asymptotically negligible. But when S → ∞
with n fixed, only wτ ,L(X) and wτ ,U(X) becomes asymptotically negligible.
9.2. Social Interactions: The Case of an Ordered Action Space. Consider a situation
where individual players choose from an ordered action space A = {a¯1, · · ·, a¯K}, 0 = a¯1 <
, · · ·, < a¯K . As before, we assume that there are S disjoint information groups. The set of
ECONOMETRIC INFERENCE ON A LARGE GAME 43
the players in each information group s is denoted by Ns. Suppose that for each k = 1, · · ·, K
and for each player i, the payoff differential is given by
ui(a¯k, a−i;Ti)− ui(a¯1, a−i;Ti) = v1,θ1 (Xi) +
v2,θ2 (Xi) a¯k
Ns − 1
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
aj − ηi,
where ηi’s are i.i.d with CDF G and independent of Xi’s. When v2,θ2 (Xi) > 0, there is
strategic complementarity between player i and the other players in his information group.
Similarly as before, we assume that G has a symmetric (around zero) and quasiconcave
density such as a centered normal or logistic distribution.
9.2.1. Belief-Free Hindsight Regrets in Theorem A1. To define belief-free hindsight regret in
Theorem A1, first note that for each k = 2, · · ·, K and for each j 6= i, ∆ij,ρ(Ti; yi(Ti)) is a
K − 1 vector of zeros if j ∈ N\Ns, and
∆ij(Ti; yi(Ti)) =
v2,θ2 (Xi) a¯K
Ns − 1 [|a¯k − yi(Ti)|]
K
k=1,a¯k 6=yi(Ti) ,
if j ∈ Ns\{i}. The difference between yi(Ti) and a¯k represents the difference between player
i’s action in equilibrium (observed the econometrician) and her alternative action a¯k. The
a¯K is the maximum perturbation of actions possible by player j. Then, we define Λ˜i(Ti) as
(9.7) Λ˜i(Ti) =
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
∆ij,ρ(Ti; yi(Ti))∆ij,ρ(Ti; yi(Ti))
>.
Using Λ˜i(ti), we define λi,ρ(ti) as in (8.2). For k = 2, · · ·, K, let the (k − 1)-th entry of
λi,ρ(Ti) be denoted by λ¯i,ρ(a¯k).
9.2.2. Bounds in Theorem A2. Let us turn to the bounds in Theorem A2. We proceed
similarly as before, with some modifications. We define for k = 2, · · ·, K,
pii,U(Y−i, Xi; a¯k) = G
(
v+1,i(a¯k) + v2,ia¯kY¯−i,s
)
and
pii,L(Y−i, Xi; a¯k) = 1−G
(
v−1,i(a¯k) + v2,ia¯kY¯−i,s
)
,
where we set Y¯−i,s ≡ 1Ns−1
∑
j∈Ns\{i} Yj,
v+1,i(a¯k) ≡ v1,θ1 (Xi) + λ¯i,ρ(a¯k),
v−1,i(a¯k) ≡ v1,θ1 (Xi)− λ¯i,ρ(a¯k), and
v2,i ≡ v2,θ2 (Xi) .
For the computation of the maximal variations of pii,U(·, Xi; a¯k) and pii,L(·, Xi; a¯k), we first
define
hi(a¯k) =
v2,ia¯K(Ns − 2)a¯k
Ns − 1 .
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Note that the factor a¯K is the maximum variation caused to Y¯−ij,s ≡ 1Ns−2
∑
k∈Ns\{i,j} Yk,
j ∈ Ns\{i} by an arbitrary perturbation of actions by the players in Ns\{i, j}. The smallest
value of zero for the sample mean Y¯−ij,s arises when all the players in Ns\{i, j} takes 0 and
the largest value of a¯K arises when all the players take a¯K . Recall the definition of ϕs in
(9.5). Let
z+i (a¯k) ≡
{
ϕs
(
a¯Kv2,i; v
+
1,i(a¯k), v
+
1,i(a¯k) + hi(a¯k)
)
, if hi(a¯k) ≥ 0
ϕs
(
a¯Kv2,i; v
+
1,i(a¯k) + hi(a¯k), v
+
1,i(a¯k)
)
, if hi(a¯k) < 0
and similarly,
z−i (a¯k) ≡
{
ϕs
(
a¯Kv2,i; v
−
1,i(a¯k), v
−
1,i(a¯k) + hi(a¯k)
)
, if hi(a¯k) ≥ 0
ϕs
(
a¯Kv2,i; v
−
1,i(a¯k) + hi(a¯k), v
−
1,i(a¯k)
)
, if hi(a¯k) < 0
.
The premultiplication by a¯K in a¯Kv2,i above is due to the fact that the maximum impact
any individual player j ∈ Ns\{i} can cause to player i’s payoff is a¯Kv2,i/(Ns − 1). For all
j ∈ N and k = 2, · · ·, K, the maximal variations djl,U(a¯k) and djl,L(a¯k) are then taken as
follows:
djl,U(a¯k) =
1
N
S∑
s=1
∑
i∈Ns
1 {j ∈ Ns\{i}}
1− ρi
∣∣∣∣G(z+i (a¯k) + v2,ia¯kNs − 1
)
−G (z+i (a¯k))∣∣∣∣ gil(Xi), and
djl,L(a¯k) =
1
N
S∑
s=1
∑
i∈Ns
1 {j ∈ Ns\{i}}
1− ρi
∣∣∣∣G(z−i (a¯k) + v2,ia¯kNs − 1
)
−G (z−i (a¯k))∣∣∣∣ gil(Xi),
with ρi ≡ ρ1{|v2,i| > 0}. Let dL,j and dU,j be L(K − 1) dimensional vectors obtained by
vertically stacking up djl,U(a¯k)’s and djl,L(a¯k)’s with k = 2, · · ·, K first and then l = 1, · · ·, L.
Using these vectors, define L(K − 1)× L(K − 1) matrices:
(9.8) D˜L(X) =
N∑
j=1
dL,jd
>
L,j and D˜U(X) =
N∑
j=1
dU,jd
>
U,j.
Finally, we construct for a given small number τ ∈ (0, 1) wτ ,L(X) and wτ ,U(X) as in (8.7).
9.3. Social Interactions: The Case of an Unordered Action Space. Let us consider
a situation where the action space is A = {a¯1, · · ·, a¯K}, and the action space does not have
any meaningful ordering, as in the case of a choice set in a multinomial choice model. As
before, we assume that there are S disjoint information groups. The set of the players in
each information group s is denoted by Ns. Suppose that for each k = 2, · · ·, K and for each
player i, the payoff differential is given by
ui(a¯k, a−i;Ti) = v
(k)
1,θ1
(Xi) +
v
(k)
2,θ2
(Xi)
Ns − 1
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
1 {aj = a¯k} − ηik,
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where v
(k)
1,θ1
’s and v
(k)
2,θ2
’s are parametric functions, and the unobserved heterogeneity vector
ηi = (ηi1, · · ·, ηiK) follows the Type 1 extreme value distribution. The payoff of player i
choosing action a¯k as opposed to a¯1 depends on the proportion of the other people in her
information group s who also choose the same action a¯k:
1
Ns − 1
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
1 {aj = a¯k} .
When one specifies v
(k)
2,θ2
(Xi) = θ2, the parameter θ2 measures the significance of such pro-
portions on player i’s decision on choosing a¯k.
9.3.1. Hindsight Regrets in Theorem A1. As for the hindsight regrets in Theorem A1, for
each j 6= i, ∆ij(Ti; yi(Ti)) is a K − 1 vector defined as
∆ij(Ti; yi(Ti)) =
1 {j ∈ Ns\{i}}
Ns − 1
[
|v(k)2,θ2 (Xi) |
]K
k=1,a¯k 6=yi(Ti)
.
Then, we define Λ˜i(Ti) as in (9.7), and define λi,ρ(ti) as in (8.2). For each k = 2, · · ·, K, we
let the (k − 1)-th entry of λi,ρ(ti) be denoted by λ¯i,ρ(a¯k) as before.
9.3.2. Bounds in Theorem A2. As for the bounds in Theorem A2, we define for k = 2, · · ·, K,
v+1,i(a¯k) ≡ v(k)1,θ1 (Xi) + λ¯i,ρ(a¯k),
v−1,i(a¯k) ≡ v(k)1,θ1 (Xi)− λ¯i,ρ(a¯k), and
v
(k)
2,i ≡ v(k)2,θ2 (Xi) .
Then, let Y¯−i,s ≡ 1Ns−1
∑
j∈Ns\{i} Yj as before. We write
pii,U(Y−i, Xi; a¯k) = P+i,k
(
Y¯−i,s, 0
)
and
pii,L(Y−i, Xi; a¯k) = P−i,k
(
Y¯−i,s, 0
)
,
where
P+i,k (y, x) =
exp
(
v+1,i(a¯k) + v
(k)
2,i y + x
)
1 +
∑K
r=2 exp
(
v+1,i(a¯r) + v
(r)
2,i y + x
) and
P−i,k (y, x) =
exp
(
v−1,i(a¯k) + v
(k)
2,i y + x
)
1 +
∑K
r=2 exp
(
v−1,i(a¯r) + v
(r)
2,i y + x
) .
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Let us compute the maximal variation of pii,U(·, Xi; a¯k) and pii,L(·, Xi; a¯k) along the j-th
coordinate for j ∈ Ns\{i}:
Vj (pii,U(·, Xi; a¯k)) = max
y∈Ys
∣∣∣∣∣P+i,k
(
y,
v
(k)
2,i
Ns − 1
)
− P+i,k (y, 0)
∣∣∣∣∣ , and
Vj (pii,U(·, Xi; a¯k)) = max
y∈Ys
∣∣∣∣∣P−i,k
(
y,
v
(k)
2,i
Ns − 1
)
− P−i,k (y, 0)
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where Ys = {0, 1/(Ns − 2), 2/(Ns − 2), · · ·, 1}. Note that the maximal variations above do
not depend on j ∈ Ns\{i}. Using this, we find that for all j ∈ N and k = 2, · · ·, K, the
maximal variations djl,U(a¯k) and djl,L(a¯k) are then defined as follows:
djl,U(a¯k) =
1
N
S∑
s=1
∑
i∈Ns
1 {j ∈ Ns\{i}}
1− ρ(k)i
max
y∈Ys
∣∣∣∣∣P+i,k
(
y,
v
(k)
2,i
Ns − 1
)
− P+i,k (y, 0)
∣∣∣∣∣ gil(Xi), and
djl,L(a¯k) =
1
N
S∑
s=1
∑
i∈Ns
1 {j ∈ Ns\{i}}
1− ρ(k)i
max
y∈Ys
∣∣∣∣∣P−i,k
(
y,
v
(k)
2,i
Ns − 1
)
− P−i,k (y, 0)
∣∣∣∣∣ gil(Xi),
with ρ
(k)
i ≡ ρ1{|v(k)2,i | > 0}. Using djl,U(a¯k) and djl,L(a¯k) with k = 2, · · ·, K, we define
L(K − 1) × L(K − 1) matrices D˜L(X) and D˜U(X) as in (9.8). Finally, we construct for a
given small number τ ∈ (0, 1) wτ ,L(X) and wτ ,U(X) as in (8.7).
9.4. A Large Game with Multiple Overlapping Reference Groups: The Case of
Ordered Action Space. Suppose that the large game is a private information game with
multiple overlapping information groups Ns with s = 1, · · ·, S. The action space is ordered
as 0 = a¯1 <, · · ·, < a¯K . The payoff function for player i takes the following form: for each
k = 2, · · ·, K,
ui(a¯k, a−i;Ti)− ui(a¯1, a−i;Ti) = vθ1(a¯k;Xi) +
a¯kθ2
|Si|
∑
s∈Si
 1
Ns − 1
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
aj
+ ηi,
where Si ⊂ S denotes the set of the indices of the reference groups that player i belongs to,
and ηi’s are i.i.d. random variables independent of Xi, and have a marginal CDF G whose
density is symmetric around zero and quasiconcave.
Each group s may represent social groups. The within-group correlation is permitted
through the public signal Cs. More importantly the reference groups are allowed to be
overlapping, so that each player i may belong to multiple reference groups simultaneously
and yet differently from many other players.
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9.4.1. Belief-Free Hindsight Regret in Theorem A1. Let player i belong to information group
s. Then for each j ∈ N, we have
∆ij(ti; yi(ti)) =
a¯Kθ2
|Si|
(∑
s∈Si
1{j ∈ Ns\{i}}
Ns − 1
)
[|a¯k − yi(ti)|]Kk=1:a¯k 6=yi(ti) ,
so that ∆ij(ti; yi(ti)) is a K − 1 dimensional column vector. Then, we define Λ˜i(Ti) as in
(9.7), and define λi,ρ(ti) as in (8.2). For each k = 2, · · ·, K, we let the (k − 1)-th entry of
λi,ρ(ti) be denoted by λ¯i,ρ(a¯k).
In particular, when A = {0, 1}, the term ∆ij(ti; yi(ti)) becomes a scalar so that λi,ρ(ti) is
also a scalar map in the following form:
|θ|
√√√√− log ρ
2
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
1
|Si|
∑
s∈Si
1 {j ∈ Ns\{i}}
Ns − 1
)2
,
as we saw in Section 3.3.2.
9.4.2. Bounds in Theorem A2. We consider the bounds in Theorem A2. Similarly as before,
we define for k = 2, · · ·, K,
pii,U(Y−i, Xi; a¯k) = G
(
v+i (a¯k) + θ2a¯kY¯−i
)
and
pii,L(Y−i, Xi; a¯k) = 1−G
(
v−i (a¯k) + θ2a¯kY¯−i
)
,
where we set Y¯−i,s ≡ 1Ns−1
∑
j∈Ns\{i} Yj and
Y¯−i ≡ 1|Si|
∑
s∈Si
Y¯−i,s,
and
v+i (a¯k) ≡ vθ1 (a¯k;Xi) + λ¯i,ρ(a¯k), and
v−i (a¯k) ≡ vθ1 (a¯k;Xi)− λ¯i,ρ(a¯k).
For the computation of the maximal variations of pii,U(·, Xi; a¯k) and pii,L(·, Xi; a¯k), we define
hi(a¯k) =
θ2a¯K a¯k
|Si|
∑
s∈Si
Ns − 2
Ns − 1 .
To obtain explicit solutions to the supremums in (9.3) and (9.4), we define for each a < b
and ∆ ∈ R,
ϕi(∆; a, b) ≡ argmaxz∈[a,b]
∣∣∣∣∣G
(
z +
∆
|Si|
∑
s∈Si
1
Ns − 1
)
−G (z)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
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It is not hard to check that we have an explicit solution as follows:
ϕi(∆; a, b) = 1
{
− ∆
2|Si|
∑
s∈Si
1
Ns − 1 < a
}
a
+1
{
a ≤ − ∆
2|Si|
∑
s∈Si
1
Ns − 1 ≤ b
}(
− ∆
2|Si|
∑
s∈Si
1
Ns − 1
)
+1
{
b ≤ − ∆
2|Si|
∑
s∈Si
1
Ns − 1
}
b,
Let
z+i (a¯k) ≡
{
ϕi
(
θ2a¯K ; v
+
i (a¯k), v
+
i (a¯k) + hi(a¯k)
)
, if hi(a¯k) ≥ 0
ϕi
(
θ2a¯K ; v
+
i (a¯k) + hi(a¯k), v
+
i (a¯k)
)
, if hi(a¯k) < 0
and similarly,
z−i (a¯k) ≡
{
ϕi
(
θ2a¯K ; v
−
i (a¯k), v
−
i (a¯k) + hi(a¯k)
)
, if hi(a¯k) ≥ 0
ϕi
(
θ2a¯K ; v
−
i (a¯k) + hi(a¯k), v
−
i (a¯k)
)
, if hi(a¯k) < 0
.
For all j ∈ N and k = 2, · · ·, K, the maximal variations djl,U(a¯k) and djl,L(a¯k) are then taken
as follows:
djl,U(a¯k) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∣∣G (z+i (a¯k) + θ2a¯kpij)−G (z+i (a¯k))∣∣ gil(Xi)
1− ρ1
, and
djl,L(a¯k) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∣∣G (z−i (a¯k) + θ2a¯kpij)−G (z−i (a¯k))∣∣ gil(Xi)
1− ρ1
,
with ρ1 ≡ ρ1{|θ2| > 0}, and
pij =
1
|Si|
∑
s∈Si
1 {j ∈ Ns\{i}}
Ns − 1 .
Using djl,U(a¯k)’s and djl,L(a¯k)’s, define L(K − 1) × L(K − 1) matrices D˜L(X) and D˜U(X)
as in (9.8), and construct for a given small number τ ∈ (0, 1), wτ ,L(X) and wτ ,U(X) as in
(8.7).
9.5. A Large Game with Multiple Overlapping Reference Groups: The Case of
Unordered Action Space. Similarly as before, let us consider the case that the large
game is a private information game with multiple overlapping information groups Ns with
s = 1, · · ·, S. The action space is an unordered set {a¯1, · · ·, a¯K}. Suppose that the payoff for
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player i is specified as follows: for k = 2, · · ·, K,
ui(a¯k, a−i;Ti) = v
(k)
θ1
(Xi) +
θ2,k
|Si|
∑
s∈Si
 1
Ns − 1
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
1 {aj = a¯k}
− ηik,
where Si ⊂ S denotes the set of the indices of the reference groups that player i belongs
to, and, v
(k)
θ1
(Xi) is a parametric function, and the unobserved heterogeneity vector ηi =
(ηi1, · · ·, ηiK) follows the Type 1 extreme value distribution. The payoff of player i choosing
action a¯k depends on the average of the proportions of players choosing a¯k among the social
group s’s that player i belongs to.
9.5.1. Belief-Free Hindsight Regret in Theorem A1. Let player i belong to information group
s. Then for each j ∈ N, we have
∆ij(ti; yi(ti)) =
1
|Si|
(∑
s∈Si
1{j ∈ Ns\{i}}
Ns − 1
)
[|θ2,k|]Kk=1,k 6=yi(ti) ,
so that ∆ij(ti; yi(ti)) is a K − 1 dimensional column vector. Then, we define Λ˜i(Ti) as in
(9.7), and define λi,ρ(ti) as in (8.2). As before, for each k = 2, · · ·, K, we let the (k − 1)-th
entry of λi,ρ(ti) be denoted by λ¯i,ρ(a¯k).
9.5.2. Bounds in Theorem A2. As for the bounds in Theorem A2, we define for k = 2, · · ·, K,
v+i (a¯k) ≡ v(k)θ1 (Xi) + λ¯i,ρ(a¯k), and
v−i (a¯k) ≡ v(k)θ1 (Xi)− λ¯i,ρ(a¯k).
Then, let
B
(k)
−i ≡
1
|Si|
∑
s∈Si
 1
Ns − 1
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
1 {Yj = a¯k}
 ,
and
B−i =

B
(2)
−i
B
(3)
−i
...
B
(K)
−i
 .
Now we write
pii,U(Y−i, Xi; a¯k) = p¯ii,U (B−i, 0; a¯k) and
pii,L(Y−i, Xi; a¯k) = p¯ii,L (B−i, 0; a¯k) ,
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where, for θ2 = (θ2,2, · · ·, θ2,K) and y = (y2, · · ·, yK) ∈ [0, 1]K−1,
p¯ii,U (y, θ2; a¯k) = P
+
i,k
(
y,
θ2,k
|Si|
∑
s∈Si
1
Ns − 1
)
and
p¯ii,L (y, θ2; a¯k) = P
−
i,k
(
y,
θ2,k
|Si|
∑
s∈Si
1
Ns − 1
)
,
where
P+i,k (y, x) =
exp
(
v+i (a¯k) + θ2,kyk + x
)
1 +
∑K
r=2 exp
(
v+i (a¯r) + θ2,ryr + x
) and
P−i,k (y, x) =
exp
(
v−1,i(a¯k) + θ2,kyk + x
)
1 +
∑K
r=2 exp
(
v−1,i(a¯r) + θ2,ryr + x
) .
Let us compute the maximal variation of pii,U(·, Xi; a¯k) and pii,L(·, Xi; a¯k) along the j-th
coordinate for j ∈ N\{i}.
Vj (pii,U(·, Xi; a¯k)) = max
y∈Ys
|p¯ii,U (y, pijk; a¯k)− p¯ii,U (y, 0; a¯k)| , and
Vj (pii,L(·, Xi; a¯k)) = max
y∈Ys
|p¯ii,L (y, pijk; a¯k)− p¯ii,L (y, 0; a¯k)| ,
where Ys = {0, 1/(Ns − 2), 2/(Ns − 2), · · ·, 1}K−1 and
pijk =
θ2,k
|Si|
∑
s∈Si
1 {j ∈ Ns\{i}}
Ns − 1 .
Using this, we find that for all j ∈ N and k = 2, · · ·, K, the maximal variations djl,U(a¯k) and
djl,L(a¯k) are then defined as follows:
djl,U(a¯k) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
maxy∈Ys |p¯ii,U (y, pijk; a¯k)− p¯ii,U (y, 0; a¯k)| gil(Xi)
1− ρ , and
djl,L(a¯k) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
maxy∈Ys |p¯ii,U (y, pijk; a¯k)− p¯ii,U (y, 0; a¯k)| gil(Xi)
1− ρ .
By stacking up djl,U(a¯k) and djl,L(a¯k), k = 2, · · ·, K, and l = 1, · · ·, L, we construct L(K −
1) × L(K − 1) matrices D˜L(X) and D˜U(X) as in (9.8). Finally, we construct for a given
small number τ ∈ (0, 1) wτ ,L(X) and wτ ,U(X) as in (8.7).
10. Multivariate Extension of McDiarmid’s Inequality
We extend McDiarmid’s inequality (McDiarmid (1989)) to a multivariate situation. Here
is the result.
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Lemma A1 (Multivariate McDiarmid’s Inequality): Let N = {1, ···, N} and let X =
(X1, · · ·, XN) ∈ RN be a random vector such that the entries are conditionally independent
given a random vector Z. Let f = (f1, · · ·, fL) : RN → RL be a given map. Then the
following holds.
(i) For all ε ∈ (0,∞)L,
P {f(X)− E [f(X)|Z] ≥ Λε|Z} ≤ exp (−2ε>Λε) ,
where Λ is an L× L matrix whose (l, k)-th entry is given by
N∑
i=1
Vi (fl)Vi (fk) ,
and Vi(fl) and Vi(fk) are the maximal variations of fl and fk along the i-th coordinate.
(ii) For all ρ > 0, we have
P
{
f(X)− E [f(X)|Z] ≥ −
√
− log ρ
2piΛ
ΛeΛ|Z
}
≤ ρ,
where piΛ > 0 and eΛ are the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue and eigenvector of matrix Λ
defined in (i).
Note that the matrix Λ is positive semidefinite but not necessarily nonsingular. This
multivariate bound is crucial for obtaining a form of belief-free hindsight regret that is tight
enough for the econometrician’s use.
Proof: (i) The proof here is obtained by slightly modifying the proof of Theorem 6.7 of
McDiarmid (1989). For transparency, a full proof is provided. Suppose that g(x1, · · ·, xN) is
a real-valued function on a set XN ⊂ RN . We recall here the definition of maximal variation
of a function at a coordinate j:
Vj(g) = sup |g(x)− g(xj(x))| ,
where the supremum is over all x’s in XN and over all xj(x)’s in XN such that xj(x) is x
except for its j-th entry. We also define
V +j (g) = sup{g(x)− g(xj(x))} and
V −j (g) = inf{g(x)− g(xj(x))},
where the supremum and the infimum are over all x’s in XN and over all xj(x)’s in XN
such that xj(x) is x except for its j-th entry. For each i = 1, · · ·, N , and l = 1, · · ·, L, let
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gi,l(X) ≡ E [fl(X)|Gi], Gi ≡ (X1, · · ·, Xi), and g0,l(X) ≡ E[fl(X)|Z]. Then observe that for
each l = 1, · · ·, L,
D−i,l ≤ gi,l(X)− gi−1,l(X) ≤ D+i,l,
where D+i,l = V
+
i (gi,l − gi−1,l) and D−i,l = V −i (gi,l − gi−1,l). Note that
D+i,l −D−i,l ≤ Vi (gi,l − gi−1,l) ≤ Vi (fl) ≡ ci,l.
Therefore, we conclude that for any t = (t1, · · ·, tL)> ∈ (0,∞)L,
0 ≤
L∑
l=1
tl
(
D+i,l −D−i,l
) ≤ t>ci,
where ci = (ci,1, · · ·, ci,L)>. By Hoeffding’s Lemma (see Lemma 5.8 of McDiarmid (1989)),
we find that for all t = (t1, · · ·, tL)> ∈ (0,∞)L,
E
[
exp
(
L∑
l=1
tl(gi,l(X)− gi−1,l(X))
)
|Gi−1, Z
]
≤ exp
((
t>ci
)2
8
)
.
We let gi = (gi,1, · · ·, gi,L)> and bound P {f(X)− E [f(X)|Z] ≥ Λε|Z} by
e−t
>ΛεE
[
e
∑N
i=1 t
>(gi(X)−gi−1(X))|Z
]
= e−t
>ΛεE
[
e
∑N−1
i=1 t
>(gi(X)−gi−1(X))E
[
et
>(gN (X)−gN−1(X))|Gi−1, Z
]
|Z
]
≤ e−t>ΛεE
[
e
∑N−1
i=1 t
>(gi(X)−gi−1(X))e(t
>ci)
2
/8|Z
]
.
By repeating the steps in the equality above, we bound the last term by
e−t
>Λε+
∑N
i=1(t>ci)
2
/8 = e−t
>Λε+t′Λt/8,
where we note that
N∑
i=1
(
t>ci
)2
= t>
(
N∑
i=1
cic
>
i
)
t = t>Λt.
A minimizer t of the last exponential function is given by t = 4ε, giving the bound as
e−2ε
>Λε.
(ii) By replacing ε = cs in (i), for some c > 0, where s ∈ S1 ≡ {x ∈ RL : ||x|| = 1}, we
obtain the following
P {f(X)− E [f(X)|Z] ≥ cΛs|Z} ≤ exp (−2c2s>Λs) .
We minimize the exponential bound over s ∈ S to find that P {f(X)− E [f(X)|Z] ≥ ΛsΛ|Z} ≤
exp(−2c2piΛ), where piΛ is a maximum eigenvalue of Λ, and sΛ is an associated eigenvector.
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Note that Λ is a positive semidefinite and nonnegative matrix. Hence piΛ is a Perron-
Frobenius eigenvalue, and we can take sΛ to be the associated eigenvector eΛ that has
nonnegative entries. (See Theorem 8.1 of Serre (2010), p.150.) Finally, by replacing c by√−(log ρ)/(2piΛ), we find the desired inequality. 
11. Mathematical Proofs of the Main Results
We prove the results of Theorems A1-A4 in the appendix of the paper. Theorems 1-4
follow as corollaries for the special case of A = {0, 1}.
Proof of Theorem A1: Since Ti’s, i ∈ N, are conditionally independent given C by
Assumption 1, (Tj)j∈N\{i} is conditionally independent given (Ti, C). (See Lemma 4.2(ii) of
Dawid (1979).) Since Ti already contains Cs as its subvector, we deduce that (Tj)j∈N\{i}
is conditionally independent given Ti. Now we use this conditional independence to apply
Lemma A1. For any v ∈ S+ ≡ {x ∈R|A|−1+ : ||x|| = 1}, and any c > 0,
Qi
{
u∆i (Y−i;Ti, Yi) > cΛi(ti)v|Ti = ti
}
≥ 1− exp (−2c2v>Λi(ti)v) ,
as in (3.6), by Lemma A1(i). By Lemma A1(ii), the last bound becomes 1−ρ, once we choose
c =
√− log ρ/(2ψi(ti)) and v = vi(ti). The second statement follows from Assumption 2
and the first statement. 
Proof of Theorem A2: We focus on the case where δU(X) > 0 and δL(X) > 0. The
cases where δU(X) = 0 and δL(X) = 0 are simpler to deal with. Define the event: for a¯ ∈ A,
Si,U(a¯) ≡
{
u∆i (Ti, a¯) ≥ −λi,ρ(Ti, a¯)
}
.
By the definition of λi,ρ(Ti, a¯), Assumption 1, and the second statement of Theorem 1, we
have (everywhere)
(11.1) P{Si,U(Yi)|Ti} ≥ 1− ρ.
Now, observe that
(11.2) P{Si,U(Yi)|Ti} =
∑
a¯∈A
P{Si,U(a¯)|Ti}1 {Yi = a¯} ≥ 1− ρ.
The first equality uses the fact that Yi = yi(Ti) is measurable with respect to the σ-field of
Ti. From this and the fact that Yi = yi(Ti), we deduce that
(11.3) 1 {Yi = a¯} ≤ 1
{
P{S˜i,U(a¯)|Ti} ≥ 1− ρ
}
,
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where S˜i,U(a¯) ≡ Si,U(a¯) ∩ {Yi = a¯}. Similarly also from (11.2), we have
1 {Yi 6= a¯} ≤ 1
 ∑
c∈A\{a¯}
P {Si,U(c) ∩ {Yi = c} |Ti} ≥ 1− ρ
 .
Since Si,U(c) ∩ {Yi = c} is disjoint across c’s, we conclude that
1 {Yi 6= a¯} ≤ 1
{
P
{
S˜i,L(a¯)|Ti
}
≥ 1− ρ
}
,
where
S˜i,L(a¯) ≡
⋃
c∈A\{a¯}
Si,U(c) ∩ {Yi = c} .
Taking conditional expectation given (Y−i, Xi) on both sides of (11.3) and using Markov’s
inequality, we find that
P {Yi = a¯|Xi} ≤ 1
1− ρE
[
P (S˜i,U(a¯)|Ti)|Xi
]
.(11.4)
=
1
1− ρP (S˜i,U(a¯)|Y−i, Xi)−
1
1− ρRi,U(a¯),
where Ri,U(a¯) ≡ P (S˜i,U(a¯)|Y−i, Xi)− P (S˜i,U(a¯)|Xi). Similarly,
(11.5) P {Yi 6= a¯|Xi} ≤ 1
1− ρP (S˜i,L(a¯)|Y−i, Xi)−
1
1− ρRi,L(a¯),
where Ri,L(a¯) ≡ P (S˜i,L(a¯)|Y−i, Xi)− P (S˜i,L(a¯)|Xi).
Since gil(Xi) ≥ 0, we multiply both ends of (11.4) by gil(Xi), sum them up over i = 1, ···, N ,
and divide them by N to find that for a¯ ∈ A,
1
N
N∑
i=1
P {Yi = a¯|Xi} gil(Xi)(11.6)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
1
1− ρP (S˜i,U(a¯)|Y−i, Xi)gil(Xi)− vl,U(a¯),
where vl,U(a¯) ≡ 1N
∑N
i=1
1
1−ρRi,U(a¯)gil(Xi). Similarly, from (11.5), we also find that
1
N
N∑
i=1
P {Yi = a¯|Xi} gil(Xi)(11.7)
≥ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
1− 1
1− ρP (S˜i,L(a¯)|Y−i, Xi)
)
gil(Xi) + vl,L(a¯),
where vl,L(a¯) ≡ 1N
∑N
i=1
1
1−ρRi,L(a¯)gil(Xi).
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Now it suffices to control vl,U(a¯) and vl,L(a¯). We write
e˜i,U(a¯) ≡ P {Yi = a¯|Xi} − 1
1− ρP (S˜i,U(a¯)|Y−i, Xi)
and let e˜i,U be a vector whose entries are e˜i,U(a¯) with a¯ running in A. Similarly, we write
e˜i,L(a¯) ≡ P {Yi = a¯|Xi} −
(
1− 1
1− ρP (S˜i,L(a¯)|Y−i, Xi)
)
,
and let e˜i,L be a vector whose entries are e˜i,L(a¯) with a¯ running in A. We let for a given
vector of nonnegative constants wU = (wl,U(a¯))
L
l=1,a¯∈A and wL = (wl,L(a¯))
L
l=1,a¯∈A,
(11.8) M˜(wU ,wL) ≡ M˜L(wL) ∩ M˜U(wU),
where
M˜L(wL) =
{
1
N
N∑
i=1
e˜i,L ⊗ gi(Xi) + wL ≥ 0
}
and
M˜U(wU) =
{
1
N
N∑
i=1
e˜i,U ⊗ gi(Xi)−wU ≤ 0
}
.
By (11.6) and (11.7),
(11.9) P
(
M˜L(vL)|X
)
= 1 and P
(
M˜U (vU) |X
)
= 1,
where vL = (vl,L(a¯))
L
l=1,a¯∈A and vU = (vl,U(a¯))
L
l=1,a¯∈A. For wτ ,U(X) and wτ ,L(X) as given in
the theorem, define the event
M˜A ≡ {vU ≤ wτ ,U(X) and vL ≤ wτ ,L(X)} .
Then we write
P (M˜ (wτ ,U(X),wτ ,L(X)) |X)(11.10)
= P
(
M˜ (wτ ,U(X),wτ ,L(X)) ∩ M˜A|X
)
+P
(
M˜ (wτ ,U(X),wτ ,L(X)) ∩ M˜cA|X
)
.
The first probability on the right hand side is increasing in (wτ ,U(X),wτ ,L(X)). Hence by
the definition of M˜A, and using (11.9), we find that
P
(
M˜ (wτ ,U(X),wτ ,L(X)) ∩ M˜A|X
)
≥ P
(
M˜A|X
)
.
Since the event in the left-hand side probability is contained in that in the right-hand side
probability, we deduce that
P
(
M˜ (wτ ,U(X),wτ ,L(X)) ∩ M˜A|X
)
= P
(
M˜A|X
)
.
56 SONG
From this and (11.10), we conclude that
P (M˜ (wτ ,U(X),wτ ,L(X)) |X)(11.11)
≥ P
(
M˜A|X
)
= 1− P
(
M˜cA|X
)
.
Now, it suffices to obtain a bound for the last probability. For this, note that
(11.12) P
{
M˜cA|X
}
≤ P {vU > wτ ,U(X)|X}+ P {vL > wτ ,L(X)|X} .
We analyze the first probability only. The second probability can be analyzed similarly. We
write
vl,U(a¯) = fl,U(Y,X; a¯) and vl,L(a¯) = fl,L(Y,X; a¯),
for some functions fl,U(·, ·; a¯) and fl,L(·, ·; a¯). Then, note that for each j ∈ N,
Vj (fl,L(·, X; a¯)) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
Vj (pii,L(·, Xi; a¯)) gil(Xi)
1− ρi(a¯)
= djl,L(a¯) and
Vj (fl,U(·, X; a¯)) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
Vj (pii,U(·, Xi; a¯)) gil(Xi)
1− ρi(a¯)
= djl,U(a¯),
where the last equalities use the definition of djl,L(a¯) and djl,U(a¯). Note that vU and vL are
nonstochastic functions of (Y1, · · ·, YN , X), and by Assumption 3(iii), Yi’s are conditionally
independent given (X,C). We use the definition of wτ ,U(X) and wτ ,L(X), and apply Lemma
A1 to deduce that
P {vU > wτ ,U(X)|X,C} ≤ τ
2
and
P {vL > wτ ,L(X)|X,C} ≤ τ
2
.
Taking conditional expectation given X on both sides of these inequalities and using (11.12),
we have
P
{
M˜cA|X
}
≤ P {vU > wτ ,U(X)|X}+ P {vU > wτ ,U(X)|X} ≤ τ .
By applying this to (11.11), we obtain the desired inequality. 
The following lemma is obtained by applying Basu (1988)’s result on CLT for Banach
valued martingale difference arrays to Rd-valued martingale difference arrays. In contrast
to Basu (1988), however, the current lemma gives a more explicit bound for the normal
approximation. This explicit bound is crucial for our bootstrap validity that is uniform over
a wide class of probabilities.
Lemma A2: Suppose that X1, ···, Xn is a sequence of Rd-valued martingale difference arrays
with a filtration {Fn} with d ≥ 1. Let Sn = Σni=1Xi and let Yn be a normal random vector
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which has zero mean and covariance matrix equal to that of Sn. For this covariance matrix,
we assume that its smallest eigenvalue is bounded from below by cn > 0 for each n ≥ 1.
Furthermore, assume that for each n ≥ 1,
(11.13) P
{
n∑
i=1
E
[
XiX
>
i |Fi−1
]
= Vn
}
= 1, for some constant matrix Vn.
Then,
sup
0<r
|P {‖Sn‖ ≤ r} − P {‖Yn‖ ≤ r}| ≤ Cd
c
3/2
n
(
B−3n
n∑
i=1
E||Xi||3
)1/4
,
where Cd > 0 is a constant that depends only on d, and Bn ≡
√∑n
i=1 E||Xi||2.
Proof : Since cn > 0,
sup
r>0
|P {‖Sn‖ ≤ r} − P {‖Yn‖ ≤ r}|
= sup
r>0
|P {‖Sn,c‖ ≤ r} − P {‖Yn,c‖ ≤ r}| ,
where Sn,c = Sn/
√
cn and Yn,c = Yn/
√
cn. Then, certainly the smallest eigenvalue of
E
[
Yn,cY
>
n,c
]
is bounded from below by 1. Suppose that there exists Cd > 0 satisfying that
(11.14) P {r ≤ ||Yn,c|| < r + ε} ≤ Cdε
c2n
,
for all r ≥ 0, all ε > 0, and all n ≥ 1, where Cd > 0 is a constant that depends only on d.
Then by inspecting the proof of Theorem 1 of Basu (1988), we find that for any ε > 0,
sup
r>0
|P {‖Sn,c‖ ≤ r} − P {‖Yn,c‖ ≤ r}| ≤ C2ε−3δn + C1ε
c2n
,
where C2 > 0 is an absolute constant, and
δn = B
−3
n
n∑
i=1
E||Xi||3.
(To see that C2 > 0 is an absolute constant, note that C2 involves three constants C1,1, C1,2
and C1,3, where C1,1 is the constant that depends on the choice of fn at the beginning of the
proof of Theorem 1 in Basu (1988), C1,2 is the constant in (1.1) which can be taken to be 1
in our case with Rd, and C1,3 is the constant in Lemma 5 in Basu (1988) which is certainly
an absolute constant that does not depend on the choice of a Gaussian random vector.)
It remains to show that there exists an absolute constant C1 > 0 that satisfies (11.14).
Once this is done, the proof is complete by choosing ε = (C2δn)
1/4(C1/c
2
n)
−1/4.
Let Ω = EYn,cY
>
n,c. Then the spectral decomposition gives Ω = BΛB
>, where B is an
orthogonal matrix and Λ is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues, λ1, · · ·, λd, of Ω. Then, we have
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for all r and ε > 0,
(11.15) P {r ≤ ||Yn,c|| < r + ε} = P
{
r ≤ ||B>Yn,c|| < r + ε
}
,
and E
[
B>Yn,cY >n,cB
]
= B>ΩB = Λ. When d = 1 or 2, it is not hard to show that the
density of ||B>Yn,c|| is bounded, so that we have (11.14). Now let us focus on the case where
d ≥ 3. Let fn,2 be the density function of ||B>Yn,c||2 and fn,1 that of ||B>Yn,c||, so that we
have for y > 0,
(11.16) fn,2(y
2) =
fn,1(y)
2y
.
Note that
B>Yn,c
d
=
d∑
j=1
Zj
√
λjej,
where Zj ∼ i.i.d. N(0, 1) across j’s. By Lemma 3 of Linde and Rosinsky (1994), we find
that
(11.17) fn,2(y) ≤ 1
2c2n
P

∥∥∥∥∥
d∑
j=3
Zj
√
λjej
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ y
 .
Since
√
λj ≥ 1 for all j = 1, · · ·, d (through the division by √cn in the definition of Yn,c),
Theorem 1 of Jensen (1984) implies that the last probability is bounded by
P

∥∥∥∥∥
d∑
j=3
Zn,jej
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ y
 = Gd−2 (y) ,
whereGd−2 (·) is the CDF of χ2d−2-distribution. Let gd−2(·) be the density of χ2d−2-distribution.
Then certainly Cd ≡ supy≥0 ygd−2(y2) <∞. Therefore, we have for all y > 0,
fn,1(y) ≤ y
c2n
gd−2
(
y2
) ≤ Cd
c2n
.
Thus we conclude from (11.15) that
P {r ≤ ||Yn,c|| < r + ε} =
∫ r+ε
r
fn,1(y)dy ≤ Cdε
c2n
.
Thus we obtain the desired result. 
Proof of Theorem A3: As in (5.4), we decompose lU(θ) and lL(θ) and apply Theorem
2 to obtain that
(11.18) lU(θ)−wτ ,U(X) ≤ ζ ≤ lL(θ) + wτ ,L(X),
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with probability at least 1− τ . From (11.18), we find the inequality:
(11.19)
∥∥[lU(θ)−wτ ,U(X)]+ + [lL(θ) + wτ ,L(X)]−∥∥2 ≤ ‖ζ‖2 ,
with probability at least 1− τ . Now, our asymptotic analysis focuses on ‖ζ‖2. For this, we
show that ζ is the sum of martingale difference arrays, and use Lemma A2 above. However,
we need to deal with the possibility that
√
Nζ exhibits a degenerate distribution in the limit
which is not allowed in Lemma A2. To deal with the case of asymptotically degenerate
distribution in a way that is uniform over P ∈ P , we use arguments similar to those in the
proof of Theorem 2 of Lee, Song and Whang (2014).
First, we define a ”regularized version” of ζ. For this, fix a small number 0 < λ < 1/2
and let d ≡ L(K − 1), i.e., the dimension of ζ, and let {νi,λ : i ∈ N} be a sequence of i.i.d.
L(K − 1)-dimensional random vectors such that the entries are distributed i.i.d. as uniform
[−√3λ,√3λ] and {νi,λ}∞i=1 is independent of {(Yi, Xi, C)}∞i=1. Let
ζi,λ ≡ ζi + νi,λ, and ζλ ≡
1
N
N∑
i=1
ζi
where ζi ≡ r∗i ⊗ gi(Xi), r∗i is a column vector of entries r∗i (a¯) = 1 {Yi = a¯} − P {Yi = a¯|Xi}
with a¯ ∈ A\{a¯1}. Let
Fi,λ ≡ σ
({(Yj)ij=1, (vj,λ)ij=1, X, C) , Fλ ≡ ∩∞i=1Fi,λ,
so that Fi,λ and Fλ are σ-fields that are augmented with (vk,λ)ik=1. We define
Fi ≡ σ
({(Yj)ij=1, X, C) , F ≡ ∩∞i=1Fi.
Note that (Yj,vj,λ)’s are conditionally independent across j’s given (X,C). By the construc-
tion of (vj,λ)
i
j=1, it is not hard to see that Fλ = F = σ(X,C), i.e., the σ-field generated by
(X,C). Then we let the conditional CDF of ||√Nζ|| given F be denoted by Fζ(·|F) and
that of ||√Nζλ|| given Fλ be denoted by Fζ,λ(·|Fλ). Also, we define
Vλ ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
ζi,λζ
>
i,λ|Fi−1,λ
]
.
Then, note that by design, we can show that ||√Nζλ|| has a nondegenerate limiting distri-
bution, even when ||√Nζ|| is asymptotically degenerate, as long as λ > 0. The precise form
of this claim is as follows, which we prove later.
Claim 1: There exists Cd > 0 such that for each λ ∈ (0, 1/2),
P
{
E
[
sup
t>0
|Fζ,λ(t|Fλ)− Fζ,λ,∞(t|Fλ)| |C
]
≤ CdhN(λ)
}
= 1,
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where Fζ,λ,∞(t|Fλ) ≡ P{||V 1/2λ Z|| ≤ t|Fλ} and Z ∼ N(0, I), independent of all the other
random variables and
(11.20) hN(λ) ≡
{
Cg + λ
2
}1/4
λ15/4N1/8
,
and Cd > 0 is a constant that depends only on the dimension d of the vector ζi,λ.
Note that the L1-approximation error bound hN(λ) does not depend on P ∈ P . Therefore,
the bound in Claim 1 is uniform over P ∈ P . Also, note that hN(λ)→ 0 for each λ > 0, as
N →∞. Therefore, for any η > 0,
inf
P∈P
P
{
sup
t>0
|Fζ,λ(t|Fλ)− Fζ,λ,∞(t|Fλ)| > η
}
≤ 1
η
inf
P∈P
E
[
sup
t>0
|Fζ,λ(t|Fλ)− Fζ,λ,∞(t|Fλ)|
]
≤ CdhN(λ)
η
→ 0
as N → ∞ for each fixed λ > 0. In other words, the conditional distribution of ||√Nζλ||
given Fλ is asymptotically approximated by that of ||V 1/2λ Z|| uniformly over P ∈ P .
The second result that we establish below is that the distributional difference between√
Nζλ and
√
Nζ is not very large, when λ > 0 is small enough.
Claim 2: For any ε > 0, there exists ηε > 0 such that for each λ ∈ (0, ηε),
P
{
E
[
sup
t≥ε
|Fζ(t|F)− Fζ,λ(t|F)| |C
]
≤ C3
(√
λ+ CdhN(λ)
)
+ λd
}
= 1,
where C3 > 0 is an absolute constant.
Again, note that the bound C3{
√
λ + CdhN(λ)} + λ does not depend on P ∈ P . Hence
for each η > 0, as N →∞, and then λ→ 0, we have
inf
P∈P
P
{
sup
t≥ε
|Fζ(t|F)− Fζ,λ(t|F)| > η
}
→ 0.
Now we establish a bootstrap version of these results similarly. Define
Gi ≡ σ
(
(εj,b)
i
j=1, Y,X
)
, G ≡ ∩∞i=1Gi,
and
Gi,λ ≡ σ
(
(vj,λ)
i
j=1, (εj,b)
i
j=1, Y,X
)
, Gλ ≡ ∩∞i=1Gi,λ.
By the construction of (vj,λ)
i
j=1 and (εj,b)
i
j=1, it is not hard to see that Gλ = G = σ(Y,X). Let
Yi be a (K−1)-dimensional vector whose entries are given by 1 {Yi = a¯k} with k = 2, · · ·, K.
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Let
Z ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
Zi,
where
Zi ≡
(
Yi ⊗ gi(Xi)− 1
N
N∑
j=1
Yj ⊗ gj(Xj)
)
εi,b.
We also define again a regularize version of Zˆ as follows:
Zλ ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
Zi,λ,
and
Zi,λ ≡
(
Yi ⊗ gi(Xi)−
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Yi ⊗ gi(Xi)
)
+ vi,λ
)
εi,b.
Let the conditional CDF of ||√NZλ|| given Gλ be denoted by FZ,λ(·|Gλ) and that of ||
√
NZ||
given G be denoted by FZ(·|G). As for the covariance matrix of Zi,λ, let
Wλ ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
Zi,λZ
>
i,λ|Gi−1,λ
]
.
Then, we establish results similar to Claims 1 and 2 for Z and Zλ.
Claim 3: There exists C ′d > 0 such that for each λ ∈ (0, 1/2),
P
{
E
[
sup
t>0
|FZ,λ(t|Gλ)− FZ,λ,∞(t|Gλ)| |C
]
≤ C ′dhN(λ)
}
= 1,
where FZ,λ,∞(t|Gλ) ≡ P{W 1/2λ Z ≤ t|Gλ}, C ′d > 0 is a constant that depends only on d, and
hN(λ) is as defined in (11.20).
Claim 4: For any ε > 0, there exists ηε > 0 such that for each λ ∈ (0, ηε),
P
{
E
[
sup
t≥ε
|FZ(t|G)− FZ,λ(t|G)| |C
]
≤ C3
(√
λ+ C ′dhN(λ)
)
+ λd
}
= 1,
where C3 > 0 is an absolute constant.
The following result establishes that the limiting distribution of
√
Nζλ is first order
stochastically dominated by that of
√
NZλ.
Claim 5: For any ε > 0, we have
P
{
inf
t≥ε
(Fζ,λ,∞(t|Fλ)− FZ,λ,∞(t|Gλ)) ≥ −Cε,dh˜N(λ)|C
}
= 1,
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where Cε,d > 0 is a constant that depends only on ε > 0 and d, and
h˜N(λ) = λ+
d
λ3
(√
Cg
N
+
Cg
N
)
.
By chaining Claims 1-5, we find that the conditional distribution of
√
Nζ is stochastically
dominated by that of
√
NZ as N → ∞ and then λ → 0, and hence obtain the desired
result. Let c∗1−α,∞ be the (1−α+ τ)-th percentile of the bootstrap distribution of T ∗b . More
specifically, observe that by the definition of c∗1−α,∞,
1− α + τ ≤ FZ(c∗1−α,∞ ∨ ε|Y,X).
The last CDF is bounded by
P
{||ζ||2 ≤ c∗1−α,∞ ∨ ε|F}+ oP (1),
by Claims 4, 3, 1, and 2, after sending N →∞ and then λ→ 0, uniformly over P ∈ P . By
(11.19), the leading probability is bounded by
P
{
T (θ) ≤ c∗1−α,∞ ∨ ε|F
}
+ τ ,
uniformly over P ∈ P . The last term τ is due to the fact that the probability that (11.19)
fails is bounded by τ . Hence, the uniform asymptotic validity of the bootstrap is obtained.
Proof of Claim 1: Since Xi is part of Ti, Lemma 4.2(ii) of Dawid (1979) combined with
Assumption 1 implies that Ti is conditionally independent of Tj’s with j 6= i given (Xi, C).
Furthermore, Yi is a function of Ti = (ηi, Xi) and ηi is conditionally independent of C given
X by Assumption 3(iii). Hence we have Yi is conditionally independent of C given X. Thus
we deduce that for each a¯ ∈ A,
P {Yi = a¯|Fi−1} = P {Yi = a¯|X,C}(11.21)
= P {Yi = a¯|Xi} .
Since (Yi,vi,λ) is measurable with respect to Fi,λ for all i ≥ 1, and E [vi,λ|Fi−1,λ] = 0 for all
i ≥ 2, we find that {ζi,λ}∞i=1 is a martingale difference array with respect to the filtration
{Fi,λ}∞i=1 under the conditional probability P{·|X,C}.
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We apply the uniform bound for in the CLT in Lemma A2. First, note that by the
definition of νi,λ,
Vλ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
ζiζ
>
i |Fi−1
]
+ λ2I(11.22)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
ζiζ
>
i |X,C
]
+ λ2I,
where the last equality follows from the fact that Yi is a function of (ηi, Xi) and ηi’s are
conditionally independent given (X,C). Therefore, Vλ is the covariance matrix of ζλ, and is
almost everywhere constant with respect to the conditional probability P{·|X,C}, satisfying
(11.13) of Lemma A2. Furthermore, from (11.22), the minimum eigenvalue of Vλ is bounded
from below by λ2 everywhere, and λ does not depend on P ∈ P and
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[||ζi,λ||2|X,C] ≥ dλ2,
where we recall d ≡ L(K − 1). Therefore, we can use Lemma A2 to deduce the following:
E
[
sup
t>0
∣∣∣P {∥∥∥√Nζ∥∥∥ ≤ t|X,C}− P {||V 1/2λ Z|| ≤ t|X,C}∣∣∣ |C](11.23)
≤ Cd
λ15/4N1/8
E
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[||ζi,λ||3|X,C]
)1/4
|C
 ,
where Cd > 0 is a constant that depends only on d. As for the last expectation in (11.23), we
us Lyapounov’s inequality and apply the law of iterated conditional expectations to bound
it by (
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[||ζi,λ||3|C]
)1/4
≤
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
4E
[||ζi||3|C]+ 4E [||vi,λ||3|C])
)1/4
≤
(
4
N
N∑
i=1
E
[||ζi||3|C]+ 4λ2d3/2
)1/4
,
where the second inequality follows because each entry of vi,λ takes values inside [−1, 1], and
||vi,λ|| ≤
√
d and E [||vi,λ||2|C] ≤ λ2d. As for the leading sum, we have with probability 1
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[||ζi||3|C] ≤ d3/2N
N∑
i=1
E
[
max
1≤l≤L
||gil(Xi)||3|C
]
≤ d3/2Cg,
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by (8.8). Hence we obtain the bound for (11.23) as
√
2Cd
{
Cg + λ
2
}1/4
λ15/4N1/8
.
Redefining Cd to be
√
2Cd, we obtain the desired result.
Proof of Claim 2: First, we bound
|Fζ(t|F)− Fζ,λ(t|F)| ≤ P
{∣∣∣∥∥∥√Nζ∥∥∥− t∣∣∣ ≤ ∆λ|F} ,
where
∆λ ≡
∥∥∥∥∥ 1√N
N∑
i=1
νi,λ
∥∥∥∥∥ .
By Claim 1,
E
[
sup
t>0
∣∣∣P {∣∣∣∥∥∥√Nζ∥∥∥− t∣∣∣ ≤ ∆λ|F}− P {∣∣∣∥∥∥V 1/2λ Z∥∥∥− t∣∣∣ ≤ ∆λ|F}∣∣∣ |C]
≤ 2CdhN(λ).
Let Zλ be a centered normal random vector whose covariance matrix is a diagonal matrix
with diagonal elements equal to the eigenvalues of Vλ. We write
P
{∣∣∣∥∥∥V 1/2λ Z∥∥∥− t∣∣∣ ≤ ∆λ|F}(11.24)
= P
{
|‖Zλ‖ − t| ≤ ∆λ and ∆λ ≤
√
λ|F
}
+P
{
|‖Zλ‖ − t| ≤ ∆λ and ∆λ >
√
λ|F
}
.
The first probability is bounded by
P
{(
t−
√
λ
)2
≤ ||Zλ||2 ≤
(
t+
√
λ
)2
|F
}
≤
∫ (t+√λ)2
(t−√λ)2
fλ(y|F)dy,
where fλ(y|F) denotes the conditional density of ||Zλ||2 given F . Note that Zλ is condition-
ally independent of F given Vλ. Furthermore, the density fλ(·|F) is unimodal, and there
exist absolute constants η > 0 and C2 > 0 that do not depend on λ and for each t ≥ ε > 0,
sup
x∈[t−η,t+η]
fλ(x|F) ≤ C2.
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This is because the neighborhood [t− η, t+ η] is away from zero for small η’s. Therefore, for
all λ < η2, ∫ (t+√λ)2
(t−√λ)2
fλ(y|F)dy ≤
∫ (t+√λ)2
(t−√λ)2
C2dy = 4C2
√
λ.
The second probability in (11.24) is bounded by (for some c1 > 0)
1
λ
E
∥∥∥∥∥ 1√N
N∑
i=1
νi,λ
∥∥∥∥∥
2
 = 1
λN
N∑
i=1
E
[||νi,λ||2] ≤ λd.
We conclude that there exists η1 > 0 such that for each t ≥ ε and each λ ∈ (0, η1),
E [|Fζ(t|F)− Fζ,λ(t|F)| |C] ≤ C3
(√
λ+ CdhN(λ)
)
+ λd,
where C3 > 0 is an absolute constant.
Proof of Claim 3: We find that E [Zi,λ|Gi−1,λ] = 0. Furthermore, Zi,λ is Gi,λ-measurable
for each i ≥ 1. Hence {Zi,λ}∞i=1 is a martingale difference array with respect to the filtration
{Gi,λ}∞i=1. We also note that
Wλ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
ZiZ
>
i |Gi−1
]
+ λ2I
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
ZiZ
>
i |Y,X
]
+ λ2I ≥ λ2I.
Certainly, Wλ is the conditional covariance matrix of Zλ given (Y,X), and is almost every-
where constant given (Y,X). Also, note that
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[||Zi,λ||2|Y,X] ≥ λ2d.
For γi = max1≤l≤L ||gil(Xi)||3, we have
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[||Zi,λ||3|Y,X] ≤ 4d3/2( 1
N
N∑
i=1
γi + λ
2
)
E
[|εi,b|3](11.25)
= 8
√
2
pi
d3/2
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
γi + λ
2
)
.
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Therefore, we can use Lemma A2 to deduce the following:
E
[
sup
t>0
∣∣∣P {∥∥∥√NZ∥∥∥ ≤ t|Y,X}− P {||W 1/2λ Z|| ≤ t|Y,X}∣∣∣ |C]
≤ C1,d
λ15/4N1/8
E
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[||Zi,λ||3|Y,X])1/4 |C
 ,
with probability one, where C1,d > 0 and C2,d > 0 are positive constants that depend on d.
From (11.25) and the condition (8.8), the last bound is again bounded by
23/8pi1/8C1,d(Cg + λ
2)1/4
λ15/4N1/8
.
Taking C ′d = 2
3/8pi1/8C1,d, we obtain the desired result.
Proof of Claim 4: The proof is precisely equal to that of Claim 2 with Vλ replaced by Wλ,
and the conditional probabilities given F replaced by conditional probabilities given G.
Proof of Claim 5: Let yi,g = Yi ⊗ gi(Xi). Note that
ζi = yi,g − E [yi,g|Fi−1] .
We write Vλ = V + λ
2I, where
V =
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
ζiζ
>
i |Fi−1
]
(11.26)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
E
[
yi,gy
>
i,g|Fi−1
]− E [yi,g|Fi−1] E [y>i,g|Fi−1]) .
We define W¯λ = W¯ + λ
2I, where
W¯ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
yi,gy
>
i,g|Fi−1
]
−
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
E [yi,g|Fi−1]
)(
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
y>i,g|Fi−1
])
.
From (11.26), we have (everywhere)
W¯λ − Vλ = 1
N
N∑
i=1
E [yi,g|Fi−1] E
[
y>i,g|Fi−1
]
−
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
E [yi,g|Fi−1]
)(
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
y>i,g|Fi−1
])
.
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We conclude that W¯λ ≥ Vλ everywhere. By Theorem 1 of Jensen (1984), we have
(11.27) P {||VλZ|| ≤ t|X,C} ≥ P
{||W¯λZ|| ≤ t|X,C} ,
because Z is independent of (X,C). It remains to compare W¯λ with Wλ.
First, observe that E[yi,g|Fi−1] = E[yi,g|Xi], as we saw in (11.21), and hence W¯λ is a
function of X only. Hence,
P
{||W¯λZ|| ≤ t|X,C} = P {||W¯λZ|| ≤ t|X}(11.28)
= P
{||W¯λZ|| ≤ t|Y,X} ,
because Z is independent of (Y,X,C).
Now, we deal with the difference between the conditional distribution of ||W¯λZ|| given
(Y,X) and that of ||WλZ||. First, we find that∣∣∣P {∥∥∥W¯ 1/2λ Z∥∥∥ ≤ t|Y,X}− P {∥∥∥W 1/2λ Z∥∥∥ ≤ t|Y,X}∣∣∣(11.29)
≤ P
{
t− ∆˜λ ≤
∥∥∥W 1/2λ Z∥∥∥ ≤ t+ ∆˜λ|Y,X} ,
where ∆˜λ = |||W¯ 1/2λ Z|| − ||W 1/2λ Z|||. Note that
∆˜λ =
∣∣∣||W¯ 1/2λ || − ||W 1/2λ ||∣∣∣ ||Z|| ≤
∣∣∣||W¯ 1/2λ ||2 − ||W 1/2λ ||2∣∣∣ ||Z||
||W¯ 1/2λ ||+ ||W 1/2λ ||
≤
∣∣tr (W¯λ −Wλ)∣∣ ||Z||
2λ
√
d
.
Choose κ ∈ (0, ε) and bound the last probability in (11.29) from below by
P
{
t− ∆˜λ
λ
≤ ‖Z‖ ≤ t+ ∆˜λ
λ
|Y,X
}
(11.30)
≤ P
{
t− κ
λ
≤ ‖Z‖ ≤ t+ κ
λ
|Y,X
}
+ P
{
∆˜λ > κ|Y,X
}
.
The second probability is bounded by
1
2λκ
√
d
E
[∣∣tr (Wλ − W¯λ)∣∣ ||Z|||Y,X]
=
1
2λκ
√
d
E
[∣∣tr (Wλ − W¯λ)∣∣ |Y,X]E [||Z||] ≤ E [∣∣tr (Wλ − W¯λ)∣∣ |Y,X]
2λκ
.
We write
Wλ − W¯λ = ξ1,N + ξ2,N ,
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where
ξ1,N =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
yi,gy
>
i,g − E
[
yi,gy
>
i,g|Fi−1
])
ξ2,N =
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
E [yi,g|Fi−1]
)(
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
y>i,g|Fi−1
])
−
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
yi,g
)(
1
N
N∑
i=1
y>i,g
)
.
First, note that ξ1,N is the sum of uncorrelated matrices. Hence using (8.8),
(11.31) E
[∥∥ξ1,N∥∥2 |C] ≤ 1N2
N∑
i=1
E
[||yi,g||4|C] ≤ d2Cg
N
.
Second, we write ξ2,N as(
1
N
N∑
i=1
E [yi,g|Fi−1]
)(
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
E
[
y>i,g|Fi−1
]− y>i,g)
)
+
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
(E [yi,g|Fi−1]− yi,g)
)
1
N
N∑
i=1
y>i,g
= A1N + A2N , say.
As for ||A1N ||, we note that∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
E [yi,g|Fi−1]
∥∥∥∥∥
∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
(E [yi,g|Fi−1]− yi,g)
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[||yi,g||4|X,C])1/4
∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
(E [yi,g|X,C]− yi,g)
∥∥∥∥∥ .
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By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and Lyapounov inequality,
E [||A1N |||C] ≤
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[||yi,g||4|C])1/4
×
√√√√√E
∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
(E [yi,g|X,C]− yi,g)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
|C

≤
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[||yi,g||4|C])1/4
√√√√ 1
N2
N∑
i=1
E [||yi,g||2|C]
≤ C1/4g
√
d×
√
dC
1/4
g√
N
=
C
1/2
g d√
N
.
Similarly, ||A2N || is bounded by∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
yi,g
∥∥∥∥∥
∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
(E [yi,g|Fi−1]− yi,g)
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
(E [yi,g|Fi−1]− yi,g)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
E [yi,g|Fi−1]
∥∥∥∥∥
∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
(E [yi,g|Fi−1]− yi,g)
∥∥∥∥∥ ,
and we have
E [||A2N |||C] ≤ Cgd
N
+
C
1/2
g d√
N
.
Therefore, we conclude that
E
[∥∥ξ2,N∥∥ |C] ≤ CgdN + 2C
1/2
g d√
N
.
Combining this with (11.31), we find that
1
2λκ
E
[∣∣tr(W¯λ −Wλ)∣∣ |C] ≤ 1
2λκ
{
3dC
1/2
g√
N
+
Cgd
N
}
.
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Therefore, from (11.29) and (11.30),
E
[
sup
t≥ε
∣∣∣P {∥∥∥W¯ 1/2λ Z∥∥∥ ≤ t|Y,X}− P {∥∥∥W 1/2λ Z∥∥∥ ≤ t|Y,X}∣∣∣ |C]
≤ sup
t≥ε
P
{
t− κ
λ
≤ ‖Z‖ ≤ t+ κ
λ
}
+
1
2λκ
{
3dC
1/2
g√
N
+
Cgd
N
}
≤ C5κ
λ
+
d
2λκ
(
3C
1/2
g√
N
+
Cg
N
)
≤ C ′dh˜N(λ),
once we take κ = λ2 and collect the absolute constants into a larger on C ′d > 0. The first
inequality uses the fact that Z is independent of (Y,X). Combining this with (11.27) and
(11.28), we obtain the desired result. 
Proof of Theorem A4: We write
l∗U,b(θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
((r∗i + ei,U(θ))⊗ gi(Xi)) εi,b.
The conditional covariance matrix of l∗U,b(θ) given (Y,X) has entries of the following form:
with a¯ ∈ A\{a¯1},
1
N
N∑
i=1
{r∗i (a¯) + ei,U(a¯)} {r∗i (a¯) + ei,U(a¯)} gil(Xi)gik(Xi)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
r∗i (a¯)r
∗
i (a¯)gil(Xi)gik(Xi)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
ei,U(a¯)ei,U(a¯)gil(Xi)gik(Xi)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
(r∗i (a¯)ei,U(a¯) + r
∗
i (a¯)ei,U(a¯)) gil(Xi)gik(Xi).
We show that the last sum is asymptotically negligible. We focus only on
1
N
N∑
i=1
r∗i (a¯)ei,U(a¯)gil(Xi)gik(Xi).
By Assumption 1, (Xi, Yi) and Y−i are conditionally independent given C. Hence by
Lemma 4.1 of Dawid (1979), (Xi, Yi, C) and (Y−i, C) are conditionally independent given C.
By Lemma 4.2 of Dawid (1979), (Xi, Yi, C) and (Y−i, C) are conditionally independent given
(Xi, C). By the property of conditional independence, this implies that (Xi, Yi) and (Y−i, C)
are conditionally independent given (Xi, C). Applying Lemma 4.1 of Dawid (1979) again,
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we conclude that (Xi, Yi) and (Xi, Y−i, C) are conditionally independent given (Xi, C). Now
since ei,U(a) is a function of (Xi, Y−i, C) only and r∗i (a¯) is a function of (Yi, Xi) only, we have
for any a¯ ∈ A\{a¯1},
E[r∗i (a¯)ei,U(a¯)|Xi, C] = E[r∗i (a¯)|Xi, C]E[ei,U(a¯)|Xi, C].
Now,
E[r∗i (a¯)|Xi, C] = P {Yi = a¯|Xi, C} − P {Yi = a¯|Xi} = 0,
where the last equality follows by Assumption 3(ii). Therefore, we conclude that
E[r∗i (a¯)ei,U(a¯)gil(Xi)gik(Xi)|X,C] = 0.
Note that r∗i (a¯)ei,U(a¯)gil(Xi)gik(Xi) is a function of (Y,X,C), and hence we write
1
N
N∑
i=1
r∗i (a¯)ei,U(a¯)gil(Xi)gik(Xi) = wlk (Y,X,C; a¯)
for some function wlk. Then, observe that for all j ∈ N,
Vj (wlk (·, X, C; a¯)) = 1
N
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
|r∗i (a¯)|Vj (pii,U(·, X, a¯)) gil(Xi)gik(Xi)
1− ρi
+
gjl(Xj)gjk(Xj)
N(1− ρj)
≤ d˜j,lk,U(a¯)
1− ρ +
gjl(Xi)gjk(Xj)
N(1− ρ)
Hence
Vj (wlk (·, X, C; a¯)) ≤ d˜j,lk,U(a¯)
1− ρ .
We fix any η > 0, and observe the following: for some absolute constant C1 > 0,
P
{∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
r∗i (a¯)ei,U(a¯)gil(Xi)gik(Xi)
∣∣∣∣∣ > η|X,C
}
≤ exp
− 2ηC1
2
∑N
j=1
{
d˜2jlk,U(a¯) +N
−2g2jl(Xj)g
2
jk(Xj)
}
/(1− ρ)2
 ,
by Lemma A2. By the condition of the theorem, we have as N →∞
max
1≤l,k≤L
max
a¯∈A
E
[
N∑
j=1
{
d˜2jlk,U(a¯) +
g2jl(Xj)g
2
jk(Xj)
N2
}
|C
]
→ 0.
Therefore, there exists a sequence aN → 0, such that
P
{
N∑
j=1
{
d˜2jlk,U(a¯) +
g2jl(Xj)g
2
jk(Xj)
N2
}
> aN
}
→ 0
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as N →∞. We conclude that
P
{∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
r∗i (a¯)ei,U(a¯)gil(Xi)gik(Xi)
∣∣∣∣∣ > η|C
}
→ 0,
as N →∞. Therefore,
1
N
N∑
i=1
r∗i (a¯)ei,U(a¯)gil(Xi)gik(Xi) = oP (1).
This implies that the conditional covariance matrix of l∗U,b(θ) given (Y,X) is equal to
1
N
N∑
i=1
(r∗i ⊗ gi(Xi)) (r∗i ⊗ gi(Xi))>
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
(ei,U(θ)⊗ gi(Xi)) (ei,U(θ)⊗ gi(Xi))> + oP (1).
Similarly, the conditional covariance matrix of l∗L,b(θ) given (Y,X) is equal to
1
N
N∑
i=1
(r∗i ⊗ gi(Xi)) (r∗i ⊗ gi(Xi))>
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
(ei,L(θ)⊗ gi(Xi)) (ei,L(θ)⊗ gi(Xi))> + oP (1).
Recall the definition of vi,λ and define
ζ∗λ,U(θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
((r∗i + ei,U(θ))⊗ gi(Xi) + vi,λ) εi,b and
ζ∗λ,L(θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
((r∗i + ei,L(θ))⊗ gi(Xi) + vi,λ) εi,b
Following the proof of Theorem A3, we can show that the conditional distribution of
TMod∗λ,b (θ) =
∥∥∥[√Nζ∗λ,U(θ)]+ + [√Nζ∗λ,L(θ)]−∥∥∥2
given (Y,X) stochastically dominates that of ||V 1/2λ Z||2. Finally, we control the difference
between the conditional distribution of TMod∗λ,b (θ) given (Y,X) and that of T
Mod∗
b (θ) given
(Y,X) as in the proof of Claim 4 in the proof of Theorem A3. 
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